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The ALI, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and the 
Federal Constitutional Case 
C. Douglas Floyd* 
The ALI's proposals for complex litigation reform, if 
enacted, would work a fundamental reallocation of power from 
the states to the federal judiciary. While the Institute's 
recommendations are in some sense "even handed," in that 
they contemplate federal-to-state transfer for the disposition of 
"complex litigation" in limited circumstances, such transfers 
are likely to be infrequent. Rather, the heart of the Institute's 
proposal for national coordination of federal and state cases 
involving common issues lies in its provision for removal from 
state to federal court of nondiverse state law-cases arising from 
the "same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences as an action pending in the federal court, [which] 
share a common question of fact with that action,"' followed by 
transfer and consolidation for disposition in a unified federal 
proceeding. The Institute's newly created Complex Litigation 
Panel is to determine whether removal should be permitted. In 
making that determination, the panel is to consider whether 
removal will "unduly disrupt or impinge upon state court or 
regulatory proceedings or impose an undue burden on the 
federal ~our ts ."~  The panel is also to determine whether 
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.S., 1964, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology; J.D., 1967, Stanford Law School. 
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX L~GATION: STATUTORY RECOMMEN- 
DATIONS AND ANALYSIS 8 5.01(a) (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL]. 
2. Id. 8 5.01(a)(2). Section 5.01(a) of the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL 
provides in full: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the Complex 
Litigation Panel may order the removal to federal court and consolidation 
of one or more civil actions pending in one or more state courts, if the 
removed actions arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences as an action pending in the federal court, and 
share a common question of fact with that action. The Complex Litigation 
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transfer and consolidation of the removed cases is warranted, 
applying the same criteria applicable to the transfer and 
consolidation of purely federal cases-that is, whether "transfer 
and consolidation will promote the just, efficient, and fair 
conduct of the a~tions."~ If these criteria are satisfied, "the 
Panel shall evaluate whether to order removal and consolidation by 
reference to (1) the criteria set forth in j 3.01 to determine whether the 
transfer and consolidation of the cases is warranted and (2) consideration 
of whether removal will unduly disrupt or impinge upon state court or 
regulatory proceedings or impose an undue burden on the federal courts. 
When making its determination under subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2), the 
Complex Litigation Panel should consider factors such as 
a. the amount in controversy for the claims to be removed; 
b. the number and size of the actions involved; 
c. the number of jurisdictions in which the state cases are lodged; 
d. any special reasons to avoid inconsistency; 
e. the presence of any special local community or state regulatory 
interests; 
f. whether removal and consolidation will result in a change in the 
applicable law that will cause undue unfairness to the parties; and 
g. the possibility of facilitating informal cooperation or coordination with 
the state courts in which the cases are lodged. 
If the standard is met, the Panel may order the cases removed, 
consolidated, and transferred pursuant to 4 3.04. 
3. Id. 8 3.01(a)(2). Section 3.01 of the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL 
provides in full: 
(a) Actions commenced in two or more United States District Courts 
may be transferred and consolidated if: 
(1) they involve one or more common questions of fact, and 
(2) transfer and consolidation will promote the just, efficient, and fair 
conduct of the actions. 
(b) Factors to be considered in deciding whether the standard set 
forth in subsection (a) is met include 
(1) the extent to which transfer and consolidation will reduce 
duplicative litigation, the relative costs of individual and consolidated 
litigation, the likelihood of inconsistent adjudications, and the comparative 
burdens on the judiciary, and 
(2) whether transfer and consolidation can be accomplished in a way 
that is fair to the parties and does not result in undue inconvenience to 
them and the witnesses. 
In considering those factors, account may be taken of matters such as 
a. the number of parties and actions involved; 
b. the geographic dispersion of the actions; 
c. the existence and significance of local concerns; 
d. the subject matter of the dispute; 
e. the amount in controversy; 
f. the significance and number of common issues involved, including 
whether multiple laws will have to be applied to those issues; 
g. the likelihood of additional related actions being commenced in the 
future; 
h. the wishes of the parties; and 
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Panel may order the cases removed, consolidated, and 
transferred pursuant to Q 3.04."~ Removal of a case shall not 
be ordered if all of the parties and the state trial judge o b j e ~ t , ~  
and removal may be limited to particular claims or  issue^.^ 
Cases in which a state is a party shall not be removed unless it 
consents .' 
The range of potentially removable state law cases in 
which there is no, or incomplete, diversity of citizenship 
between the parties is vast. Thousands of asbestos, cigarette 
smoking, and other product liability and mass tort cases now 
litigated exclusively in state court, subject to state substantive 
and choice of law rules, will, under the ALI proposal, become 
subject to removal and transfer to a potentially distant federal 
district court for disposition by a federal judge and jury. 
Moreover, the Institute's controversial choice of law provision 
contemplates that the transferee federal district court will 
apply a uniform federal choice of law rule, designed, if feasible, 
to obtain the application of a single rule of law in tort and 
contract actions arising from many different  state^.^ The effect 
of the Institute's proposal will thus be not only to require the 
i. the stages to which the actions already commenced have progressed. 
(c) When the United States is exempted by Act of Congress from 
participating in consolidated proceedings in actions under the antitrust or 
securities laws, it shall have the right to be exempted from transfer and 
consolidation under this section. 
(d) Transfer and consolidation need not be denied simply because one 
or more of the issues are not common so that consolidated treatment of 
all parts of the dispersed actions cannot be achieved. The interests of 
particular individual litigants can be considered when determining 
whether they have shown cause to be excluded from the consolidated 
proceeding, as provided in Q 3.05(a). 
4. Id. Q 5.01(a). Section 3.04 of the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL provides 
in full: 
(a) Cases may be transferred to and consolidated in any district court 
in which the just and efficient resolution of the actions will be promoted 
and fairness to the individual litigants can be facilitated. 
(b) When the just, efficient, and fair resolution of the actions will be 
promoted, the Complex Litigation Panel may designate more than one 
transferee court. The Panel should give great weight to the convenience to 
the litigants in assigning individual actions among multiple transferee 
courts. 
5. Id. Q 5.01(b). 
6. Id. Q 5.01(c). 
7 .  Id. 8 5.01(d). 
8. Id. QQ 6.01(a)-6.03(a). 
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litigation of nondiverse state tort and contract cases in a 
federal court, but also to require the application of substantive 
rules of law that will, in many cases, differ significantly from 
the substantive rules that would have been applied by the 
courts from which the actions were removed. 
The issues of federalism raised by the ALI proposal are 
self-evident. Basic principles of the constitutional allocation of 
power between federal and state courts counsel the exercise of 
caution, as well as searching debate, before such a far-reaching 
alteration of the historic division of judicial business between 
federal and state courts is adopted. Unfortunately, the 
Institute's proposal, and its proceedings, evidence little of the 
caution or deliberation that the subject requires. Federalism 
concerns are formally reflected in some of the criteria on which 
the decision to remove and transfer is to be based.g However, 
both the proposal's black letter and its comments and notes are 
driven overwhelmingly by the interests of efficiency, economy, 
and "fairness" that its proponents believe must be achieved 
where multiple cases involving common factual issues are 
pending in both federal and state courts, coupled with the 
determination that, in most cases, efficiency and economy can 
be achieved only by providing a mechanism for a unified 
disposition of all the cases in a single federal forum. 
It is not too harsh to say that the Institute's discussion of 
the federalism concerns raised by its proposal is cavalier. The 
comments to the removal provision note that some federalism 
considerations, such as the presence of any "special local 
community or state regulatory interests," have been included in 
the laundry list of factors (dominated by efficiency 
considerations) that the Complex Litigation Panel may take 
into account in determining whether removal, transfer, and 
consolidation should be ordered. The comments also assert that 
federalism concerns are an "important element in deciding 
whether a particular grouping of cases could be handled better 
in the federal or the state ~ourts."'~ However, the tone of the 
Institute's federalism discussion, and the weight it would give 
to federalism, in contrast to its overriding instrumental 
concerns, is best captured in the following passage: 
9. See id. 8 5.01(a). 
10. Id. 8 5.01 cmt. d; see also id. 8 5.01 intro. note at 219, cmt. c at 229-30. 
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The expansion of federal removal jurisdiction under 8 5.01 to 
accommodate comglex cases also is tailored to take account of 
general federalism concerns. Historically, as a matter of 
comity and federalism, federal courts have declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over certain cases deemed more 
appropriate for state court adjudication. Although the scope of 
abstention doctrines is uncertain, i t  generally reflects an 
exercise of judicial self-restraint motivated by a desire to 
avoid undue intrusion in matters properly within state 
competence. However, when Congress explicitly grants 
removal jurisdiction in order to provide an economical and 
fair forum for multiparty, multiforum disputes, it expresses a 
federal interest in these cases. To the extent that this 
expansion of removal jurisdiction might be viewed as 
undermining the states' traditional role in defining their own 
substantive law-particularly tort law-that prerogative is 
not constitutionally immune. Removal under this section fits 
within the scope of Article I11 jurisdiction and also may be 
justified as an exercise of Congress's Article I interstate 
commerce powers. l1 
The Reporter's Notes add: 
The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that 
traditional state h c t i o n s  are exempt from the enumerated 
powers of Congress in Article I. See Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Most 
aspects of federalism are reflected in self-imposed judicial 
restraints, rather than as defined limits on Congressional 
power.12 
The invocation of the abstention doctrines in this setting is 
curious, and illustrates the proposal's built-in federal court 
bias. Those doctrines are addressed to cases that already fall 
within an established grant of federal question or diversity 
jurisdiction; they consider the limited and exceptional 
circumstances in which the federal courts should postpone or 
decline to exercise that jurisdiction in favor of state proceedings 
involving the same or related issues. The issue before the 
Institute, however, was not whether the federal courts should 
decline an established grant of jurisdiction, but whether 
Congress should significantly enlarge existing jurisdictional 
11. Id. § 5.01 cmt. d. 
12. Id. cmt. d, note at 236-37. 
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authorizations to permit the removal from state courts of 
nondiverse state law cases because they involve some factual 
overlap with a pending federal case filed by other parties. 
There should be no presumption in favor of the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction in that vastly altered setting. 
Perhaps it is true that, absent the constraints of 
Article 111, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to 
remove nondiverse state law tort and contract cases to federal 
court merely because they have some factual overlap with 
federal question or diversity cases then pending in federal 
court, and because overall judicial economy, efficiency, and 
consistency of result would be obtained-although this 
proposition is hardly as self-evident as the Institute would 
imply." Perhaps it is also true that, having the power, 
Congress should exercise it, even though that would create 
unprecedented expansion of federal court jurisdiction to hear 
and determine nondiverse state law cases. The constraints of 
Article I11 remain. 
On this subject the 1nstitute9s analysis is truncated. While 
it now appears settled that Congress may not employ its 
Article I powers to expand the Article I11 jurisdiction of the 
federal courts,14 the Institute summarily asserts that its 
proposal for removal of nondiverse state law cases that arise 
from the same "transaction or occurrence" as a case then 
pending in federal court falls within the "supplemental 
jurisdiction" of the federal courts. The ALI supports its removal 
provision by analogy to the supplemental jurisdiction powers 
conferred by section 5.03. l5 In the comments to section 5 .O3, 
which broadly confers supplemental jurisdiction over claims "by 
or against any person that . . . arisen from the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of related transactions or 
occurrences as a claim that has been transferred [to the federal 
13. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that 
Congress's enactment of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, forbidding 
possession of a firearm within a school zone, exceeded the authority of the 
Commerce Clause). 
14. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 648 
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (on the issue of Congress's Article I power to 
expand Article I11 jurisdiction, the concurring and dissenting opinions represented 
the majority); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 473-78 (3d ed. 1988); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION !j 3.4 (2d ed. 1994); CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 20, at  121 (5th ed. 1994). 
15. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 5.01 cmt. d at  234. 
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district court] pursuant to 8 3.01, or removed pursuant to 
4 5.01,"'~ the Institute principally invokes the Supreme 
Court's decision in United Mine Workers u. ~ i b b s , "  
a case that directly concerned only pendent jurisdiction but 
that has provided a starting point for analyzing ancillary 
jurisdicti~n'~ as well. In that case the Supreme Court upheld 
the lower court's assumption of jurisdiction over a state claim 
brought in conjunction with a federal question claim despite 
the lack of diversity of citizenship. The Court held that as a 
matter of constitutional power, pendent jurisdiction may be 
exercised whenever the state and federal claims "compris[e] 
but one constitutional 'case,"' which requires that the federal 
and state claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative 
16. Id. 8 5.03. This section provides in full: 
(a) A transferee court shall have subject-matter jurisdiction over any 
claim by or against any person that 
(1) arises from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related 
transactions or occurrences as a claim that has been transferred to it 
pursuant to 5 3.01, or removed pursuant to 5 5.01, or 
(2) involves indemnification related to the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of related transactions or occurrences as a claim that 
has been transferred or consolidated pursuant to 8 3.01 or removed 
pursuant to 8 5.01. 
(b) The district court in its discretion may decline jurisdiction over 
any claim brought under subsection (a). In exercising its discretion, the 
court may consider factors such as: 
(1) whether the subsection (a) claim would substantially predominate 
in terms of proof, the scope of the issues raised, or the 
comprehensiveness of the remedy; 
(2) the degree to which the efficient and fair resolution of all the 
claims will be facilitated or impaired by the presence of the additional 
party or claim; 
(3) the likelihood of jury confusion and the degree to which potential 
confusion can be alleviated by any of the claim coordinating procedures of 
5 3.06; and 
(4) the degree to which accepting jurisdiction over the additional claim 
or party may intrude upon state interests or impose an undue burden on 
the federal court. 
(c) Any claim brought under subsection (a) shall be treated in the 
same manner as a claim consolidated pursuant to 8 3.01, and provisions 
such as nationwide service of process under 8 3.08 and choice of law 
under $8 6.01-6.08 shall be applicable. 
17. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
18. The comments describe ancillary jurisdiction as permitting a court already 
"hearing a claim under federal question or diversity jurisdiction also to hear 
related claims brought by defendants or intervenors." COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 8 5.03 cmt. a at  257-58 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection 
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978)). 
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fact" and be logically related so that a plaintiff "would 
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial 
pr~ceeding."'~ 
The ALI proposal does not suggest, however, "that the 
jurisdiction proposed here is exactly coextensive with 
traditional ancillary and pendent jurisdiction caselaw[,] 
because the jurisdiction asserted in those contexts has been in 
single cases, whereas supplemental jurisdiction under 5 5.03 is 
being extended over consolidated cases."20 
The comments also briefly allude to another possible 
source of power for the removal of nondiverse state law cases. 
Noting that the effect of section 5.03's conferral of jurisdiction 
is to eliminate any requirement for complete diversity of all 
parties in the consolidated state law cases, the comments flatly 
assert that "[blecause complete diversity always has been 
deemed a statutory, rather than constitutional, limitation, see 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 
(1967), the decision to extend supplemental jurisdiction to this 
class of cases is ~onstitutional."~~ 
Neither Gibbs, nor Tashire, nor the historic development of 
modern supplemental jurisdiction doctrine as embodied in the 
1990 supplemental jurisdiction statutezz will carry the weight 
that the ALI has placed on them. That is not to say that the 
ALI proposal clearly is unconstitutional. The Institute's 
proposal is not foreclosed by the Supreme Court's previous 
decisions, because those decisions have had no occasion to 
address any similar enlargement of federal court jurisdiction. 
The proposal is, by definition, a radical departure fiom the 
limited scope of Congress's previous conferrals of federal 
jurisdiction under the constitutional "heads" of federal question 
and diversity jurisdiction--even as augmented by the new 
supplemental jurisdiction statute broadly authorizing the 
assertion of what previously were termed "pendent party" and 
"ancillary" jurisdiction in federal question cases. For the same 
reason, however, it is misleading for the Institute to imply, as 
it does, that its proposals are nothing more than routine 
applications of established concepts of pendent and ancillary 
19. Id. 5 5.03 cmt. a at 258 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725) (footnote added). 
20. Id. at 258-59. 
21. Id. at 260. 
22. 28 U.S.C. $ 1367 (Supp. V 1993). 
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jurisdiction as they had developed before Finley v. United 
 state^:^ even as revitalized by the enactment of the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute to overcome the pernicious 
effects of that decision. 
11. THE HISTORICALLY IMITED SCOPE OF P~~NDENT AND 
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION 
The emergence of the term "supplemental jurisdiction" to 
encompass all circumstances in which nonjurisdictional state 
law claims may be heard by a federal court because of their 
relationships with claims falling within the seope of Article I11 
and the statutory grants of federal jurisdiction had the virtue 
of emphasizing similarities among the concepts of pendent 
claim, pendent party, and ancillary jurisdiction as they had 
evolved from Osborn v. Bank of the United Statesz4 to Finley 
v. United  state^.'^ At the same time, however, the use of a 
single term to refer to the exercise of jurisdiction in such 
widely varying contexts as the joinder of additional claims 
between parties already properly before the court under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18,'~ the joinder of claims by 
and against additional parties under Rule 20, the assertion of 
counterclaims and cross-claims under Rule 13, impleader under 
Rule 14, compulsory joinder under Rule 19, claims by and 
against intervenors under Rule 24, the claims of class members 
under Rule 23, and statutory and rule interpleader under 28 
U.S.C. Q 1335 and Rule 22, creates a powerful pressure to 
identify assertions of jurisdiction that differ significantly, both 
in their historical evolution and rationale, and in their 
potential to upset the constitutional allocation of power 
between federal and state courts. Thus, the adoption of the 
unified terminology has created a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
exercises of jurisdiction presenting fundamentally differing 
issues will be treated the same. 
The supplemental jurisdiction proposal of the ALI Complex 
Litigation Project carries this tendency to its logical extreme by 
implicitly asserting that there is no principled difference 
between the joinder of additional state-law claims between two 
23. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
24. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
25. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
26. All subsequent references to "Rules" in the text refer to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
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parties already properly in federal court in a federal question 
case and the involuntary removal from state court of the claims 
of nondiverse state tort or contract plaintiffs simply because 
they arise fkom the same transaction as a pending federal case 
between different parties. 
The 1990 Supplemental Jurisdiction S t a t ~ t e ? ~  while 
endorsing the unified supplemental jurisdiction terminology, 
avoids some of its pitfalls by expressly providing that its 
conferral of supplemental jurisdiction extends only so far as the 
nonjurisdictional claims "are so related to claims in the action 
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article I11 of the United States 
Constit~tion,"~~ and by excluding, in diversity actions, claims 
by certain plaintiffs where "exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."29 The drafters of 
the statute no doubt assumed that, in federal question cases, 
8 1367 would restore the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction 
as it had been recognized by most of the courts of appealss0 
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Finley.31 
Nevertheless, Finley explicitly had left the constitutionality of 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
28. Id. 5 1367(a). 
29. Id. 5 1367(b). 
30. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989); Giardiello v. 
Balboa Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1988); Feigler v. Tidex, Inc., 826 F.2d 
1435 (5th Cir. 1987); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 
1985); Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 995 (1974). But see, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 
551 (9th Cir. 1982); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. 
granted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). See generally 
13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 3567.2 (2d 
ed. 1984); David P. Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 753 (1978); William 
H. Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties", 33 U. Prrr. 
L. REV. 1 (1972); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": 
Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 
71 CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1983); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental 
Jurisdiction Statute-A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 
(1992); Sidney Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale 
for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 245 (1980). 
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 734, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., $ 114, a t  28 (1990) 
(explaining that the supplemental jurisdiction statute would "essentially restore the 
pre-Finley understandings of the authorization for and limits on other forms of 
supplemental jurisdiction"); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 47- 
48 (1990) (recommending that Congress expressly authorize federal courts to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction according to pre-Finley notions). 
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the exercise of such jurisdiction an unanswered question. 
Moreover, by its preservation of the statutory complete 
diversity requirement for claims by some plaintiffs in diversity 
cases, the statute avoided some of the expansion of federal 
jurisdiction that the ALI proposal now seeks to effect. 
If labels are disregarded and one focuses instead on the 
historic circumstances in which the Supreme Court has 
endorsed the determination of nonjurisdictional claims by the 
federal courts because of their relationship with federal 
question or diversity claims properly before them, it becomes 
apparent that the foundation for the ALI's jurisdictional 
proposal is far less secure than its brief analysis would imply. 
A. Pendent Claim Jurisdiction 
In the Osborn the Supreme Court considered the 
clearest case for the exercise of federal jurisdiction over non- 
federal questions. The United States Bank sued state officials, 
seeking initially to enjoin the enforcement of a franchise tax on 
the ground of the Bank's federal immunity, and subsequently, 
by an amended bill, to recover moneys that state officials had 
seized from the Bank in collection of the tax.33 The Bank's ini- 
tial claim asserted a federal immunity, but the subsequent 
claim appears to have been in the nature of trespass. The Su- 
preme Court invited reargument on the question of the effect 
and constitutionality of the act of incorporation of the Bank, 
which granted the Bank the power to sue and be sued in any 
circuit court of the United States.34 The defendants contended 
that if the Act did confer federal jurisdiction, it was unconstitu- 
tional because, in such suits, "several questions may arise . . . 
which depend on the general principles of the law, not on any 
act of C~ngress . "~~  Chief Justice Marshall rejected this conten- 
tion on the ground that federal law had created the Bank and 
authorized it to sue. Therefore, the Bank's authority to sue 
presented a federal question which was an "original ingredient" 
of every claim brought by the Bank, whether or not placed in 
issue by the defendant." 
32. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
33. Id. at 739-42. 
34. Id. at 804. 
35. Id. at 819. 
36. Id. at 822-24. 
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As to the state law questions that might arise in the case 
[ilf this were sufficient to withdraw a case from the jurisdic- 
tion of the federal Courts, almost every case, although involv- 
ing the construction of a law, would be withdrawn . . . . There 
is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the con- 
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The ques- 
tions, whether the fact alleged as the foundation of the action, 
be real or fictitious; whether the conduct of the plaintiff has 
been such as to entitle him to maintain his action; whether 
his right is barred; whether he has received satisfaction, or 
has in any manner released his claims, are questions, some or 
all of which may occur in almost every case; and if their exis- 
tence be sufficient to arrest the jurisdiction of the Court, 
words which seem intended to be as extensive as the constitu- 
tion, laws, and treaties of the Union, which seem designed to 
give the Courts of the government the construction of all its 
acts, so far as they affect the rights of individuals, would be 
reduced to almost nothing.37 
The Court illustrated the point by referring to contracts cases 
in which the Bank's authority to sue was always potentially in- 
volved, even though that authority might not be challenged in 
a particular case, and even though a case might turn entirely 
on nonfederal questions.38 The Court concluded that 
[a] cause may depend on several questions of fact and law. 
Some of these may depend on the construction of a law of the 
United States; others on principles unconnected with that 
law. If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the 
title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one 
construction of the constitution or law of the United States, 
and sustained by the opposite construction, . . . then all the 
other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which 
gives that jurisdiction. Those other questions cannot arrest 
the proceedings. Under this construction, the judicial power of 
the Union extends effectively and beneficially to that most 
important class of cases, which depend on the character of the 
cause. On the opposite construction, the judicial power never 
can be extended to a whole case, as expressed by the constitu- 
tion, but to those parts of cases only which present the partic- 
37. Id. at 819-20. 
38. Id. at 824. 
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ular question involving the construction of the constitution or 
the law.39 
Thus, 
when a question to  which the judicial power of the Union is 
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the origi- 
nal cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit 
Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of 
fact or of law may be involved in it.40 
Although Osborn at least potentially involved the assertion 
of what was until recently termed "pendent claim" jurisdiction 
with respect to the claim asserted in the amended bill, Chief 
Justice Marshall's focus was on a narrower question: whether 
federal jurisdiction over a single claim that would otherwise 
arise under federal law because it involved a federal question 
as an "original ingredient" should be held lacking because the 
final disposition of the claim also depended on questions of fact 
or state law. Osborn held, in effect, that in such circumstances, 
the entire claim, including incidental questions of state law, 
presents a single constitutional "case" that arises under federal 
law. This result could hardly have been viewed as an expansion 
of the scope of the "arising under" jurisdiction conferred by the 
Constitution. As Marshall emphasized, any other result would 
have meant, in effect, that jurisdiction in many cases that arise 
under federal law could never be exercised in an original form 
by the lower federal courts." 
Only a small step separated Osborn from the recognition of 
"pendent claim" jurisdiction in a line of cases42 culminating in 
Hurn v. ~ u r s l e r ~ ~  and United Mine Workers v. G i b b ~ . ~ ~  Those 
decisions upheld the power of the federal courts to hear state 
law claims because of their close relationship to a federal ques- 
tion claim asserted by the same plaintiff against the same 
defendant. In Hurn, which involved both a federal claim of 
copyright infringement of the plaintiffs play and a state claim 
of unfair competition based on the same facts, the Court sus- 
39. Id. at 821-22. 
40. Id. at 823. 
41. Id. at 822-23. 
42. For a review of the cases leading to the recognition of "pendent claim" 
jurisdiction, see Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 241-46 (1933). 
43. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). 
44. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
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tained the exercise of pendent jurisdiction where it concluded 
that the bill alleged a violation of only a "single right" such 
that "the claims of infkingement and unfair competition so pre- 
cisely rest upon identical facts as to be little more than the 
equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group 
of ~ircumstances."~~ However, the Court stated that 
the rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to 
assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal 
cause of action because it is joined in the same complaint 
with a federal cause of action. The distinction to be observed 
is between a case where two distinct grounds in support of a 
single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents 
a federal question, and a case where two separate and dis- 
tinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal 
in ~ h a r a c t e r . ~ ~  
The Court drew upon its previous decision in Baltimore S.S. 
Co. v. ~hillips," which had defined a cause of action for claim 
preclusion purposes in terms of whether there had been a viola- 
tion of only "one right by a single legal wrong,"48 in concluding 
that only a single cause of action was alleged by the com- 
plaint.49 This conclusion-that a federal court clearly possess- 
ing federal question jurisdiction over a federal claim also 
should be entitled to entertain state law claims that would, 
within a single judicial system, be barred by normal rules of 
preclusion-hardly represented a significant expansion of the 
scope of the Article I11 "arising under" case. Moreover, as dis- 
cussed below, a contrary result would unduly deter plaintiffs 
asserting multiple bases of recovery from availing themselves 
of the federal forum that Congress and the Constitution have 
authorized. 
In Gibbs, the Court jettisoned Hurn's "single cause of ac- 
tion" formulation as "unnecessarily grudging."50 Recognizing 
the difficulty of defining a single "cause of action," and that the 
Hurn test had been the source of "considerable confusion," the 
45. 289 U.S. at  246. 
46. Id. at 245-46 (holding that while there was jurisdiction over the federal 
and state law claims concerning the copyrighted version of the play, there was no 
jurisdiction over state law claims concerning an uncopyrighted version). 
47. 274 U.S. 316 (1927). 
48. Id. at 321. 
49. 289 U.S. at  246-47. 
50. 383 U.S. at  725. 
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Court expanded the focus from principles of preclusion to the 
Federal Rules' philosophy of attaining judicial economy by 
encouraging the broadest possible joinder of claims and parties 
consistent with fairness to the parties? Consistent with this 
broad joinder philosophy, the Court concluded that 
[plendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists 
whenever there is a claim "arising under [federal law]," and 
the relationship between that claim and the state claim per- 
mits the conclusion that the entire action before the court 
comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim 
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter juris- 
diction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive 
from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered 
without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's 
claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try 
them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substanti- 
ality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to 
hear the whole.52 
In some respects, most notably in its equation of the scope 
of the "constitutional case" that arises under federal law with 
all claims arising from a "common nucleus of operative fact" 
such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them 
all in one judicial proceeding," the opinion in Gibbs lacked any 
clear foundation in previous authority and created additional 
ambiguities to replace those that led to the Court's rejection of 
Hurn. It is easy to read the opinion expansively, however, 
based on the Court's shift in focus from Hurn's emphasis on the 
scope of preclusion to the Federal Rules' broad provisions for 
joinder of claims and parties. On this ground one might con- 
clude that a single constitutional "case" within the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts should be found to exist whenever an 
action involves a single federal claim, and the joinder of 
nonjurisdictional state law claims is authorized by whatever 
joinder provisions the drafters of the Rules have chosen to 
adopt .53 
51. Id. at 724. 
52. Id. at 725 (citations omitted). 
53. Matasar, supra note 30, at 1479 ("Supplemental jurisdiction . . . is consti- 
tutionally permissible whenever the rules governing federal procedure permit the 
joinder in one action of jurisdictionally insufficient nonfederal claims or parties 
with a jurisdictionally sufficient federal claim."). 
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So far as the effect of the Federal Rules themselves is 
concerned, this position goes much too far, if only because the 
Rules Enabling Act provides that the Rules may not "abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right,"" and the Rules 
state that they "shall not be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the United States district courts."55 The ALI 
proposal, however, contemplates that Congress is to enact its 
removal, consolidation, and supplemental jurisdiction provi- 
sions so that any constraints imposed by the Enabling Act or 
the Federal Rules are irrelevant. Nevertheless, it goes  to^ far 
to read Gibbs as holding that any provision for the joinder of 
nondiverse state law claims to federal question or diversity 
claims that Congress, for reasons of efficiency, economy, and 
fairness may choose to adopt, necessarily establishes, for that 
reason alone, that those state law claims form part of a single 
constitutional case within the meaning of Article 111. 
Unless Gibbs is to be wholly divorced from its facts, histor- 
ical antecedents, and language, it must be read with careful 
attention to its three most salient features: (1) that it involved 
the assertion of additional claims between two parties already 
properly in federal court on the basis of a claim falling within 
Article 111, (2) that the Court, while rejecting Hurn, continued 
to insist on a close factual relationship between the jurisdic- 
tional and nonjurisdictional claims by requiring that both arise 
from a "common nucleus of operative fact," and (3) that the 
Court continued to require that the "plaintifs claims be] such 
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one 
judicial pro~eeding."~~ 
Indeed, while Gibbs, in the context of claims between exist- 
ing parties, appears to have shifted the focus from preclusion to 
procedural provisions for efficient joinder, that shift was more 
54. 28 U.S.C. 5 2072(b) (1988). 
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 82. See Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 
438, 445-46 (1946). 
56. 383 US. at 725 (emphasis added). To read Gibbs as endorsing the consti- 
tutionality of any provision for joinder of jurisdictional with nonjurisdictional claims 
that Congress may choose to adopt ignores the fact that Gibbs simply had no occa- 
sion to address the scope of the constitutional case where the joinder of claims by 
or against additional parties, plaintiff or defendant, is at  issue. This reading also 
ignores the fact that even as to claims between existing parties, Rule 18 authorizes 
the joinder of any claims that one party may have against another, regardless of 
the presence or absence of any factual relationship between them. That joinder 
provision clearly exceeds the scope of pendent jurisdiction endorsed by Gibbs, which 
requires that the claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fad. 
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apparent than real. Hurn's "single right" definition of a single 
cause of action for claim preclusion purposes was undoubtedly 
confusing and difficult to apply, leading to uncertain and incon- 
sistent results. This alone provided ample basis for its rejec- 
tion. But as Gibbs' "common nucleus" test has come to be 
equated in subsequent decisions with the "same transaction or 
occurrence" language prevalent in the Federal Rules," the 
modern concept of a single "cause of actiony' for claim preclu- 
sion purposes has likewise evolved to the same standard,58 
leaving the doctrine of pendent claim jurisdiction, as reformu- 
lated in Gibbs, closely tied to the scope of preclusion that would 
be accorded within a single system of courts. Thus, in the case 
of pendent claim jurisdiction, Gibbs' reference to claims that a 
plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected to try . . . in one judicial 
proceeding," is closely tied to the scope of modern preclusion 
doctrine, just as was Hurn in its time. 
B. Ancillary Jurisdiction 
The ALI proposal defines ancillary jurisdiction as a doc- 
trine "which permits a court hearing a claim under federal 
question or diversity jurisdiction also to hear related claims 
brought by defendants or intervenors."" The comments pro- 
ceed on the widely shared premise that the holding of Gibbs re- 
garding the assertion of pendent claim jurisdiction between 
parties already properly before the court "has provided a start- 
ing point for analyzing ancillary jurisdiction as well."60 Simi- 
larly, the comments assert that "the standard for asserting sup- 
plemental jurisdiction set out in this section [5.03] effectively 
codifies current doctrine, which utilizes a transaction formula 
57. See, e.g., Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers of America, 726 F.2d 972, 
990 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Any counterclaim based on the same 'transaction or occurrence' 
as the underlying federal claim necessarily has a 'common nucleus of operative 
fact' with that claim."); Revere Cooper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 
426 F.2d 709, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that the "same transaction" standard 
is satisfied when an ancillary claim "bears a logical relationship to the aggregate 
core of operative facts which constitutes the main claim"); see also JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 2.12, at  66 (2d ed. 1993). 
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 24 (1980); see also Gonzalez 
v. Banco Central Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 756 (1st Cir. 1994); Threshermen's Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Wallingford Mut. Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1994); C.D. Anderson 
& Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1987). 
59. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 5.03 cmt. a a t  257-58. 
60. Id. at  258. 
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for evaluating whether to assert ancillary or pendent jurisdic- 
tion? 
This pivotal equation of pendent claim and ancillary juris- 
diction neglects the significantly differing historic rationale and 
development of those doctrines, and, consequently, reads too 
much into the decisions of the Supreme Court and lower feder- 
al courts sustaining the exercise of jurisdiction over nondiverse 
state law claims asserted by or against persons who were not 
parties to the original federal proceedings. In particular, the 
ALI proposal disregards that ancillary jurisdiction over claims 
by and against additional parties has, from its inception, per- 
mitted the resolution of nonjurisdictional claims on the ground, 
not simply that they arise from the same transaction as claims 
already pending before the federal court, but because the 
nonjurisdictional claims are logically dependent on the pending 
claims. 
The foundation case in the development of ancillary juris- 
diction is Freeman v. Howe?' In Freeman, the Supreme Court 
held that a state court had no power to interfere, by writ of 
replevin, with property attached by a federal marshal1 as secu- 
rity for a judgment in a federal diversity action. The Court 
rejected the contention of the plaintiffs in the state replevin 
action that, unless the writ were allowed, they would be with- 
out a remedy, because they were not diverse from the defen- 
dant in the federal action. Rather, the court recognized that the 
controlling 
principle is, that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to 
restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same 
court, and thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advan- 
tage under mesne or final process, is not an original suit, but 
ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the origi- 
nal suit, out of which it had arisen, and is maintained with- 
out reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties.63 
Similarly, in White v. E ~ i n ~ , ~ ~  the receiver of an insol- 
vent corporation was permitted to sue nondiverse debtors to 
collect on their notes, many of which were for less than the 
61. Id. 
62. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). 
63. Id. at 460 (emphasis added). 
64. 159 U.S. 36 (1895). 
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jurisdictional amount. The Court held that in the actions for 
collection on the notes, 
the court proceeds upon its own authority to collect the assets 
of an estate, with the administration of which it is charged; 
and, if the receiver in such cases appears as a party to the 
suit, it is only because he represents the court in its inherent 
power to wind up the estate of an insolvent corporation, over 
which it has by an original bill obtained jurisdiction. In this 
particular, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court does not mate- 
rially differ from that of the District Court in bankruptcy, the 
right of which to collect the assets of a bankrupt estate we do 
not understand ever to have been doubted.65 
In Fulton National Bank v. H o ~ i e r , ~ ~  the Court rejected 
the invocation of ancillary jurisdiction because there was no 
logical dependency between the claim of a nondiverse interve- 
nor and the proceedings then pending in federal court to ad- 
minister the assets of an insolvent partnership. The proposed 
intervenor, a citizen of Georgia, alleged that he had paid money 
to the partnership to be used for purchase of stocks, and that 
the partnership had deposited his check in its account with the 
Fulton National Bank, also a citizen of Georgia. When the 
partnership failed, the bank offset the funds against partner- 
ship notes held by the bank. The proposed intervenor prayed 
that the bank be made a party and be required to pay the sum 
in question to him or to the receivers, and that he ultimately 
receive a judgment against the receivers for the amount. The 
lower courts held that the federal district court had jurisdiction 
over the intervention as a "dependent controversy."67 The Su- 
preme Court reversed. It held that, as between the receivers 
and the bank, the bank had the superior claim, and that the 
real controversy was thus between the proposed intervenor and 
the bank, both of whom were Georgia citizens. This controversy 
was not within the ancillary jurisdiction of the court: 
We are of opinion that in no proper sense was the peti- 
tion dependent or ancillary to the cause instituted for the 
purpose of administering the assets of Imbrie & Company. 
Consequently, the trial court could not entertain it. 
65. Id. at 40. 
66. 267 US. 276 (1925). 
67. Id. at 279. 
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The general rule is that when a federal court has proper- 
ly acquired jurisdiction over a cause it may entertain, by 
intervention, dependent or ancillary controversies; but no 
controversy can be regarded as dependent or ancillary unless 
it  has [a] direct relation to property or assets actually or con- 
structively drawn into the court's possession or control by the 
p ~ c i p a l  suit.68 
The case before the court was not of that character because the 
receivers had no interest in the amount in question, and the 
controversy was therefore unrelated to the receivership pro- 
~eeding.~' 
In Moore v. New York Cotton ~xchange," a case frequent- 
ly cited t o  support a broad construction of ancillary jurisdiction 
based on a transactional relati~nship,~' the Supreme Court 
sustained the exercise of jurisdiction over a nondiverse compul- 
sory counterclaim that arose out of the same transaction as the 
plaintiff's antitrust claim against the defendant. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant had violated antitrust laws by re- 
fusing to supply it with quotations on the prices of cotton trad- 
ed on the exchange. The counterclaim alleged that the plaintiff, 
having been refused permission to use the quotations, had 
misappropriated them.72 The Supreme Court held that al- 
though the district court had properly dismissed the plaintiffs 
bill for failure to state a claim under the antitrust laws, the 
court continued to have jurisdiction over the counterclaim an- 
cillary to the original bill. The Court did not focus on the con- 
stitutionality of the exercise of such jurisdiction. Rather, the 
Court assumed the propriety of the exercise of ancillary juris- 
diction over a compulsory counterclaim. After concluding that 
the antitrust claim was sufficiently substantial to fall within 
the jurisdiction of the district court, the Court regarded the 
case as turning on whether, under the compulsory counterclaim 
provision of then Equity Rule 30, the counterclaim arose out of 
the same transaction as the plaintiffs action.73 In holding 
that i t  did, the Court stated: 
68. Id. at 280. 
69. Id. at 281. 
70. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). 
71. See, e.g., Richard H .  Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Prim- 
er: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 
143-44 (1983). 
72. 270 U.S. at 602. 
73. Id. at 608-09. 
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"Transaction" is a word of flexible meaning. It may compre- 
hend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much 
upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their 
logical relationship. The refusal to furnish the quotations is 
one of the links in the chain which constitutes the transaction 
upon which appellant here bases its cause of action. It is an 
important part of the transaction constituting the subject- 
matter of the counterclaim. It is the one circumstance without 
which neither party would have found it necessary to seek 
relief. Essential facts alleged by appellant enter into and 
constitute in part the cause of action set forth in the coun- 
terclaim. . . . 
So close is the connection between the case sought to be 
stated in the bill and that set up in the counterclaim, that it 
only needs the failure of the former to establish a foundation 
for the latter; but the relief afforded by the dismissal of the 
bill is not complete without an injunction restraining appel- 
lant from continuing to obtain by stealthy appropriation what 
the court had held it could not have by judicial compulsi~n.~~ 
Moore is commonly viewed as a case sustaining the exer- 
cise of "ancillary" jurisdiction over compulsory counter- 
c laim~.?~ Because of its emphasis on the "same transaction7' 
language of the compulsory counterclaim rule, Moore could be 
viewed as having based the constitutionality of all forms of 
ancillary jurisdiction on the existence of a transactional rela- 
tionship between the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
claims. This, however, reads far too much into Moore. In the 
first place, the Court's opinion was not addressed to the consti- 
tutional issue, but simply proceeded on the assumption that no 
independent basis for jurisdiction over a compulsory counter- 
claim was required. More importantly, Moore was a particular- 
ly obvious case for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, 
because, like the pendent claim jurisdiction sustained in Gibbs, 
it involved the assertion of claims based on essentially identical 
operative facts between parties already properly before the 
federal court. Additionally, the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
counterclaim was so dependent on the resolution of the main 
claim that "it only need[ed] the failure of [the main claim] to 
establish a foundation for [the counterclaim] ."76 
74. Id. at 610 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
75. See 13 CHARLES k WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PFtACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
8 3523 (2d ed. 1984). 
76. 270 U.S. at 610. 
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Moore thus combined attributes of the transactional rela- 
tionship that undergirds pendent claim jurisdiction and the 
logical dependence that historically has sustained ancillary 
jur isdi~t ion.~~ Moreover, its result was necessary to permit a 
party already properly in federal court fully to defend itself 
without suffering the risk of potentially inconsistent results in 
separate proceedings. Moore thus provides only weak support 
for the conclusion that the existence of a transactional relation- 
ship alone is sufficient to support the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction over nonjurisdictional claims by or against non- 
parties to a federal action. 
In the years following Moore, the lower federal courts ex- 
panded the concept of ancillary jurisdiction to encompass a 
wide variety of claims in cases not involving the jurisdiction of 
a federal court over property or funds subject to its control. 
These included Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaims ,78 Rule 
13(g) cross claims,7g additional Rule 13(h) parties on counter- 
claims and cross c l a i m ~ , ~ ~  Rule 24(a) claims by and against 
77. See Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limita- 
tions on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 413 (1936) ("The reasons for the rule 
of the Moore case, apart from considerations of convenience and efficiency, which 
presumably have nothing to do with the question of power, are apparently to be 
found in the adumbrations of ancillary or auxiliary jurisdiction, of the equity doc- 
trine of complete relief and of the doctrine that a court which has acquired posses- 
sion of property has, by that possession, jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against 
that property.") (emphasis added). 
78. See, eg., Brach v. Amoco Oil Co., 677 F.2d 1213, 1226 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that a counterclaim that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence 
as the original action is compulsory and falls under the court's ancillary jurisdic- 
tion); Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1359 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[A] 
compulsory counterclaim falls within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts 
even if i t  would ordinarily be a matter for state court consideration."); see also 
McCaffrey v. Rex Motor Transp., Inc., 672 F.2d 246, 248 (1st Cir. 1982) (stating 
that while compulsory counterclaims fall within the federal courts' ancillary juris- 
diction, permissive counterclaims under Rule 13(b) do not). See generally 6 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8 1414 (2d ed. 
1990). 
79. See, e.g., Transcontinental Underwriters Agency v. American Agency Un- 
derwriters, 680 F.2d 298, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing that a crossclaim 
arising between nondiverse parties does not destroy jurisdiction but falls under an- 
cillary jurisdiction.); LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa per Azioni v. Alex- 
ander, 414 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969) (same); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842, 
844 (5th Cir. 1966) (same). See generally 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 78, 8 1433. 
80. See, e.g., H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 
1967) (holding that ancillary jurisdiction exists over additional nondiverse parties 
brought into an action under a Rule 13 counterclaim); United Artists Corp. v. Mas- 
terpiece Prods., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 1955) (same). See generally 6 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 78, 8 1436. 
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intervenors as of right8' (a result now unfortunately reversed 
in diversity cases by the 1990 supplemental jurisdiction stat- 
utes2), and Rule 14 claims of derivative liability against third- 
party  defendant^.'^ With the exception of Rule 13(h) claims 
against additional parties, these assertions of jurisdiction ei- 
ther involved claims by or against parties already properly 
before the court, or, as in the early property cases, claims by or 
against new parties, the disposition of which had a dependent 
relationship to the claims already before the federal court. In 
the case of Rule 24(a) claims by and against intervenors as of 
right, for example, the basis for claiming a right to intervene is 
that the disposition of the action before the court "may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to 
protect" his interest in the property or transaction that is the 
subject of the pending action.84 A simple transactional rela- 
tionship is not enough. Indeed, the courts have rejected the 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the claims of Rule 24(b) 
permissive intervenors even though the claims present ques- 
tions in common with the claims before the court? 
81. See, eg., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 
F.2d 786, 789-93 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding ancillary jurisdiction over a claim 
against a Rule 24(a) intervenor), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Lenz v. Wag- 
ner, 240 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1957) (stating that no independent basis of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction was needed for either an intervening plaintiff or defen- 
dant under Rule 24(a)). See generally 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 8 1917 (2d ed. 1986). Under the former rule, indispens- 
able parties under Rule 19 did not fall within the federal courts' ancillary jurisdic- 
tion. See, eg., Chance v. County Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th 
Cir. 1964) (holding that there was no jurisdiction over indispensable parties when 
joining them to the action would destroy diversity). See generally 7 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE $ 1610 (2d ed. 1986). 
82. 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(b). 
83. See, e.g., Rogers v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 601 F.2d 840, 843 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 1979) ("[Ancillary jurisdiction] recognizes the power of a federal court, once 
proper subject matter jurisdiction of the main claim has been established, to adju- 
dicate as incident thereto a related claim based wholly upon state law asserted by 
the defendant against a nondiverse impleaded third-party defendant."); Stemler v. 
Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1965) (holding that no independent basis of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction is needed over a third-party defendant so long as 
there is an independent basis for jurisdiction between the original parties). See 
generally 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 78, 5 1444. 
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
85. See, e.g., Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing 
to extend ancillary jurisdiction over the state law securities claims of California's 
corporations commissioner, a permissive intervenor, even though California's securi- 
ties statutes are modeled, to a degree, after the federal securities statutes a t  issue 
in the original complaint); Hougen v. Merkel, 47 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Minn. 1969) 
(denying ancillary jurisdiction over permissive intervenor's claims even though the 
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Similarly, in the case of Rule 14 impleader, a claim may be 
asserted against a nonparty "who is or may be liable to the 
third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim 
against the third-party plaintiffg6-that is, a claim whose ex- 
istence turns not simply on a transactional relationship (and 
which in fact may involve no transactional relationship), but on 
the liability of a third party that is dependent on the resolution 
of the underlying action. 
The concept of ancillary jurisdiction in its modern form 
came before the Supreme Court in Owen Equipment & Erection 
Co. v. Kr~ger ,~? in which the Court refused to sanction the 
claim of the original plaintiff in a diversity action against a 
nondiverse third-party defendant who had been properly im- 
pleaded by the original defendant under Rule 14. The drafters 
of the ALI proposal doubtless had Owen in mind when they 
asserted that the Gibbs test "has provided a starting point for 
analyzing ancillary jurisdiction as In fact, however, to 
the extent Owen addresses the underlying concept of ancillary 
jurisdiction at  all, it stresses the concept of logical dependence 
that has supported the doctrine from its inception. 
In equating the exercise of pendent claim jurisdiction un- 
der Gibbs with the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, the ALI 
proposal draws support from Owen's observation that "the 
Court of Appeals was correct in perceiving that Gibbs and this 
case are two species of the same generic problem: Under what 
circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law 
claim arising between citizens of the same State?"gg But to say 
that both ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are concerned with 
the assertion of jurisdiction over nondiverse state law claims, 
and that the problems they pose are closely related, is not to 
say that ancillary and pendent jurisdiction are identical. More 
importantly, Owen itself explicitly declined to determine 
"'whether there are any "principled" differences between pen- 
dent and ancillary jurisdiction; or, if there are, what effect 
Gi b bs had on such differences .' 
intervenor was a passenger in a car accident that was at the heart of the original 
parties' personal injury action). See generally 7C WRIGHT, supra note 81, 9 1917. 
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
87. 437 US. 365 (1978). 
88. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 9 5.03 cmt. a at 258. 
89. 437 US. at 370. 
90. Id. at 370 n.8 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 US. 1, 13 (1976)). 
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The decision in Owen was ultimately based on the Court's 
determination that to permit the original plaintiff to assert a 
claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant would be 
contrary to the statutory complete diversity requirement. It 
thus failed the "second prong" of supplemental jurisdiction 
analysis, which requires not only constitutional power, but 
statutory authorization for a federal court to hear a nondiverse 
state law claim supplemental to its jurisdiction over federal 
question or diversity claims.g1 The Court therefore had no oc- 
casion to address whether Gibbs' "common nucleus of operative 
fact" formulation provided a sufficient constitutional basis for 
assertions of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims by 
and against additional nondiverse parties to a federal action. 
The Court simply proceeded on the "assumption'' that there 
was constitutional power to hear the claim at  issue.92 
While Owen therefore does not establish that Gibbs sanc- 
tions the ALI's proposed removal jurisdiction, Owen's discus- 
sion of ancillary jurisdiction is consistent with the historical 
antecedents of that doctrine in emphasizing the dependency of 
ancillary claims on those before the federal court, rather than 
simply their transactional relationship with the federal diversi- 
ty claims. Distinguishing the plaintiffs claim against the third- 
party defendant fiom impleader, counterclaims, and cross- 
claims in which the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction historical- 
ly had been upheld, the Court obsemed that 
the nonfederal claim in this case was simply not ancillary to 
the federal one in the same sense that, for example, the im- 
pleader by a defendant of a third-party defendant always is. 
A third-party complaint depends at least in part upon the 
resolution of the primary lawsuit. Its relation to the original 
complaint is thus not mere factual similarity but logical de- 
pendence. The respondent's claim against the petitioner, how- 
ever, was entirely separate from her original claim against 
OPPD, since the petitioner's liability to her depended not at 
all upon whether or not OPPD was also liable. Far from being 
an ancillary and dependent claim, it was a new and indepen- 
dent one.93 
91. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 US. 1, 15-17 (1976). 
92. 437 US. at 371. 
93. Id. at 376 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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The Court further distinguished the assertion of ancillary juris- 
diction over claims by defending parties haled into court 
against their will from the claims of plaintiffs against such 
parties, reasoning that 
[ilt is not unreasonable to assume that, in generally requiring 
complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the 
jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable 
to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logi- 
cally entwined lawsuit. Those practical needs are the basis of 
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction." 
In sum, although not addressed to the issue of constitution- 
al power, the Supreme Court's decision in Owen recognized 
that the relationship that historically had sustained the exer- 
cise of ancillary jurisdiction over nonjurisdictional claims by 
and against additional parties had been one of logical depen- 
dence or the necessity to resolve an entire lawsuit between 
parties already properly before the court, rather than simply 
the factual overlap and considerations of judicial economy that 
undergird the ALI proposal. 
C. Pendent Party Jurisdiction 
The concept of pendent party jurisdiction refers to the 
exercise of jurisdiction over nondiverse state law claims by or 
against additional plaintiffs or defendants that have a transac- 
tional relationship to jurisdictional claims by or against other 
plaintiffs or  defendant^.'^ Pendent party claims therefore are 
properly joined under Federal Rule 20, but do not necessarily 
possess the relationship of logical dependence that historically 
has characterized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over 
claims of impleader, interpleader, or by or against intervenors 
of right. 
By contrast to its decisions sustaining the exercise of pen- 
dent claim and ancillary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court's 
decisions before the enactment of the 1990 supplemental juris- 
diction statute evidenced a cautious approach to the significant 
94. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). 
95. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, at 151 (stating that pendent par- 
ty jurisdiction exists if "there is federal question jurisdiction-or admiralty juris- 
diction or jurisdiction because the United States is a party-of a claim against one 
party, that carries with it pendent jurisdiction of a closely related state claim 
against another party"). 
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expansion of federal jurisdiction at  the expense of the states 
that the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction entails. While 
the Court's decisions were ultimately resolved on statutory 
grounds that were partially obviated by the 1990 statute, and 
which would be eliminated in both federal question and diversi- 
ty cases by the ALI proposal, the Court's decisions clearly can- 
not be read as an endorsement of the ALI's casual assumption 
that a single constitutional case falling within the scope of 
Article I11 may be found whenever nonjurisdictional claims by 
or against additional parties arise from the "same transaction" 
as claims properly before a federal court. 
The first of the Court's pendent party decisions, Moor v. 
County of Alarned~,'~ was a civil rights action in which the 
plaintiff asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 9 1983 and state law 
against local law enforcement officers and the county. After 
concluding that the 5 1983 claim against the county could not 
be maintained on a theory of vicarious liability, the Court con- 
sidered whether plaintiffs state law claims against the county 
could be entertained pendent to the district court's jurisdiction 
over the federal claims against the officers. The Supreme Court 
ultimately concluded that, even on the assumption that the 
district court had constitutional power to exercise such jurisdic- 
tion under Gibbs, the district court had not abused its discre- 
tion in declining to do so because of the difficulty of the state 
law questions and the likelihood of jury confusion.g7 Accord- 
ingly, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the scope of the 
constitutional power of the federal courts over such pendent 
claims. In so doing, the Court voiced an emphatic note of cau- 
tion that is neither noted nor emulated in the ALI proposal. 
The Court initially observed that although there existed, as 
in Gibbs, "a common nucleus of operative fact7' between the 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims, 
there is a sigmficant difference between Gibbs and these 
cases. For the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the claims 
against the County would require us to bring an entirely new 
party-a new defendant-into each litigation. Gibbs, of 
course, involved no such problem of a "pendent party," that is, 
of the addition of a party which is implicated in the litigation 
only with respect to the pendent state law claim and not also 
96. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). 
97. Id. at 715-16. 
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with respect to any claim as to which there is an independent 
basis of federal jurisdiction." 
The Court went on to observe that virtually all of the cir- 
cuits except the Ninth had, since the decision in Gibbs, accept- 
ed the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction based on the exis- 
tence of a common nucleus of operative facts." It also noted 
that 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims against parties 
as to whom there exists no independent basis for federal ju- 
risdiction finds substantial analogues in the joinder of new 
parties under the well-established doctrine of ancillary juris- 
diction in the context of compulsory counterclaims under Fed. 
Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a) and 13(h), and in the context of third- 
party claims under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 14(a).lo0 
Rather than endorse the exercise of such jurisdiction, however, 
the Court cautioned: 
Whether there exists judicial power to hear the state law 
claims against the County is, in short, a subtle and complex 
question with far-reaching implications. But we do not consid- 
er it appropriate to resolve this difficult issue in the present 
case, for we have concluded that even assuming, arguendo, 
the existence of power to hear the claim, the District Court, in 
exercise of its legitimate discretion, properly declined to join 
the claims against the County in these suits."' 
The Court similarly refused to resolve this "subtle and 
complex question with far-reaching implications" in Aldinger v. 
Howard,102 in which it rejected a similar effort to assert a 
pendent claim against a county on the ground that the exercise 
of such jurisdiction would be contrary to the limited scope of 
jurisdiction over 4 1983 claims conferred by Congre~s , '~~ 
which, as 8 1983 was then interpreted, excluded claims against 
counties.lo4 Reviewing its previous decisions sustaining pen- 
dent claim jurisdiction, including Gibbs, the Court observed that 
98. Id. at 713 (footnote omitted). 
99. Id. at 713-14; see also sources cited supra note 30. 
100. 411 U.S. at 714-15 (footnotes omitted). 
101. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
102. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
103. Id. at 17-19. 
104. See Monroe v. Pap ,  365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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[nlone of them . . . adverted to the separate question, involved 
in the instant case, of whether a nonfederal claim could in 
turn be the basis for joining a party over whom no indepen- 
dent federal jurisdiction exists, simply because that claim 
could be derived from the "common nucleus of operative fact" 
giving rise to the dispute between the parties to the federal 
claim. lo5 
While the Court in Aldinger noted that its ancillary juris- 
diction decisions had involved the joinder of additional parties, 
those cases were also distinguishable because "[tlhe doctrine of 
ancillary jurisdiction . . . is bottomed on the notion that since 
federal jurisdiction in the principal suit effectively controls the 
property or fund under dispute, other claimants thereto should 
be allowed to intervene in order to protect their interests."lo6 
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether its decisions 
had eliminated any "principled distinction" between pendent 
claim and ancillary jurisdiction, in view of the Court's ultimate 
decision of the case on statutory grounds. The Court cautioned, 
however, that there was a significant difference between the 
situation addressed in Gibbs and the question presented by 
Aldinger: 
From a purely factual point of view, it is one thing to autho- 
rize two parties, already present in federal court by virtue of 
a case over which the court has jurisdiction, to litigate in 
addition to their federal claim a state-law claim over which 
there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. But it is 
quite another thing to permit a plaintiff, who has asserted a 
claim against one defendant with respect to which there is 
federal jurisdiction, to join an entirely different defendant on 
the basis of a state-law claim over which there is no indepen- 
dent basis of federal jurisdiction, simply because his claim 
against the first defendant and his claim against the second 
defendant "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." 
True, the same considerations of judicial economy would be 
served insofar as plaintifs claims ''are such that he would 
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceed- 
ing.  . . ." But the addition of a completely new party would 
run counter to the well-established principle that federal 
105. 427 U.S. at 9. 
106. Id. at 11. 
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courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, 
are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress. lo' 
The Court then proceeded to resolve the case by noting that, 
unlike previous decisions, it was not addressing the issue of 
supplemental jurisdiction in the face of congressional silence. 
Rather, Congress had addressed itself to the jurisdictional 
issue, and, by implication, had excluded the exercise of supple- 
mental jurisdiction over § 1983 claims against c~unties.''~ 
Having reached this conclusion, the Court again cautioned that 
"[ilf the new party sought to be joined is not otherwise subject 
to federal jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to the 
exercise of pendent jurisdiction than if parties already before 
the court are required to litigate a state-law claim," and that 
"the question of pendent-party jurisdiction is 'subtle and com- 
plex,' and we believe that it would be as unwise as it would be 
unnecessary to lay down any sweeping pronouncement upon 
the existence or exercise of such j~risdiction.""~ 
In its most recent consideration of pendent party jurisdic- 
tion in Finley u. United States,"' the Court once again 
sc~pulously avoided the issue of constitutional power. Rather, 
in a much-criticized result,"' the Court concluded that pen- 
dent party jurisdiction over state law claims against additional 
nondiverse parties in an action against the United States un- 
der the Federal Tort Claims Act was improper absent express 
statutory authorization, despite the fact that the federal dis- 
trict courts possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the FTCA suit, 
and the entire controversy could therefore be resolved only in 
federal court. Once again, the Court noted the fundamental dif- 
ference between the pendent party situation and the pendent 
claim jurisdiction involved in Gibbs, and simply assumed, with- 
out deciding, that the exercise of such jurisdiction, had it been 
authorized by Congress, would have been con~titutional."~ In 
107. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
108. Id. at 16-19. 
109. Id. at 18. 
110. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
111. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 3, 
8 (1992) ("I believe that Finley was an unfortunate decision . . . ."); Richard D. 
Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the 
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445, 465-66 (1991) (calling the 
Finley decision a "radical" departure from previous supplemental jurisdiction deci- 
sions). 
112. 490 U.S. at 549. 
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the course of its opinion, the Court described the cases in which 
ancillary jurisdiction over claims by or against additional par- 
ties had been sustained in quite narrow terms: 
While in a narrow class of cases a federal court may assert 
authority over such a claim "ancillary" to jurisdiction other- 
wise properly vested-for example, when an  additional party 
has a claim upon contested assets within the court's exclusive 
control, or when necessary to give effect to the court's judg- 
ment--we have never reached such a result solely on the basis 
that the Gibbs test has been met.'13 
The 1990 supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted 
against this backdrop of reluctance by the Supreme Court to 
sanction the use of pendent party jurisdiction by analogy to 
Gibbs.l14 As previously noted, that statute, while retaining 
many of the constraints of the complete diversity requirement 
that the ALI now proposes to eliminate in state law cases,ll5 
broadly endorses the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction in 
federal question cases where the pendent claims "are so related 
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article I11 
of the United States Const i t~ t ion ."~~~ While the drafters of 
the statute expressed a strong preference for the exercise of 
pendent party jurisdiction based on a transactional relationship 
of the kind that had been endorsed by almost all of the courts 
of appeals before Finley,'17 the statute itself simply removes 
the "lack of statutory authorization" barrier that Finley had 
113. Id. at  551 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
114. 28 U.S.C. $ 1367. 
115. But see Free v. Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
"under $ 1367 a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members 
of a class, although they did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement"); 
Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of 
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 982 (1991) (stating that 
the $ 1367(b) exceptions "do not preclude supplemental jurisdiction over claims by 
a nondiverse plaintiff joined subsequently under Rule 20"). 
116. 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that the exercise of sup- 
plemental jurisdiction under § 1367 is mandatory, unless one of the statute's spe- 
cific exceptions applies. Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States 
Dist. Ct., 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994). The court of appeals stated that "un- 
less a court properly invokes a section 1367(c) category in exercising its discretion 
to decline to entertain pendent claims, supplemental jurisdiction must be asserted." 
Id. 
117. See H.R. REP. NO. 734, supra note 31, a t  27-29; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 31. 
850 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIWRSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
erected, leaving the ultimate constitutionality of that exercise 
to be resolved. The ALI proposal starkly raises that question. 
Despite the Supreme Court's failure explicitly to endorse 
the constitutionality of pendent party jurisdiction based solely 
on the existence of a transactional relationship between juris- 
dictional and nonjurisdictional claims, the Court could be ar- 
gued implicitly to have done so in decisions dealing with the 
state law claims of nondiverse class members. In the leading 
decision, Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,l18 diverse 
"Class A" members of an Indiana fraternal benefits association 
brought a federal class action against the association, seeking 
to enjoin an allegedly unlawful use of the funds of the associa- 
tion in connection with a reorganization involving the creation 
of a new category of "Class B" members. The action resulted in 
a judgment sustaining the reorganization.'" Indiana citizens 
who were members of Class A then commenced a state court 
action seeking to relitigate the same  question^.'^^ The Su- 
preme Court held that the federal court had ancillary jurisdic- 
tion to restrain the state court's relitigation of the questions it 
had previously resolved. 
The Court rejected the contention that the Indiana mem- 
bers of Class A could not be bound by the judgment in the 
previous federal class action because they were not of diverse 
citizenship from the defendant in that action. Rather, the Court 
held that the district court had jurisdiction to resolve their 
claims ancillary to its jurisdiction over the claims of the diverse 
members of Class A. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied on Stewart v. D ~ n h a r n . ' ~ ~  Stewart had involved a bill 
in equity by a diverse creditor seeking to set aside a convey- 
ance of a stock of merchandise. Following removal of the action, 
nondiverse co-claimants were permitted to intervene on the 
ground that the federal court had already acquired jurisdiction 
over the controversy, and the court therefore possessed ancil- 
lary jurisdiction over the claims of the other creditors asserting 
rights in the same ~ r 0 p e r t y . l ~ ~  
118. 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
119. Id. at 358-59. 
120. Id. at 357. 
121. 115 U.S. 61 (1885). 
122. Id. at 64. 
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In Ben Hur, the Supreme Court concluded that the prin- 
ciple of Stewart "controls this case."123 The Court noted that 
[i]t is true that jurisdiction, not warranted by the Constitu- 
tion and laws of the United States, cannot be conferred by a 
rule of court, but class suits were known before the adoption 
of our judicial system, and were in use in English chancery. 
Owing to the number of interested parties and the im- 
possibility of bringing them all before the court, the original 
suit was peculiarly one which could only be prosecuted by a 
part of those interested suing for all in a representative suit. 
Diversity of citizenship gave the District Court jurisdiction. 
Indiana citizens were of the class represented; their rights 
were duly represented by those before the court. The inter- 
vention of the Indiana citizens in the suit would not have 
defeated the jurisdiction already acquired. Stewart v. Dun- 
ham. Being thus represented, we think it must necessarily 
follow that their rights were concluded by the original de- 
cree. 124 
Although Ben Hur is commonly viewed as holding that 
only the named class representatives must satisfy the diversity 
of citizenship requirement in a federal class action based on 
state law, the case, on its facts, addressed a much narrower 
question. Ben Hur involved a "true" class action which sought 
to enjoin a disposition of the funds of the association in which 
all members of Class A were alleged to have a joint inter- 
e ~ t . ' ~ ~  The case thus stood directly in the line of cases sus- 
taining the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over competing 
claims to property when some of the claims were already prop- 
erly before the federal court for disposition, as in Freeman v. 
Howe. As the Supreme Court specifically noted: 
The subject-matter [of the suit] included the control and dis- 
position of the funds of a beneficial organization and was 
properly cognizable in a court of equity. The parties bringing 
the suit truly represented the interested class. If the decree is 
to be effective and conflicting judgments are to be avoided all 
of the class must be concluded by the decree.'" 
123. 255 U.S. at 365. 
124. Id. (citation omitted). 
125. Id. at 361. 
126. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). 
127. Ben Hur, 255 US. at 367. 
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In Snyder v. ~ a r r i s ' ~ ~  and Zahn u. International Paper 
Co.,12' the Supreme Court held that the enlargement of the 
scope of permissible federal class actions effected by the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23 did not alter the long-standing rules of 
aggregation applicable to the determination of the amount in 
controversy. Thus, absent some recognized basis for aggrega- 
tion, each member of a class in a federal class action must 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement despite possible 
impairment of the judicial economy sought by Rule 23.130 
While the decisions ascribed significant weight to the inter- 
ests of federalism that would be impaired by a contrary rule, 
which would transfer jurisdiction over "numerous local contro- 
versies involving exclusively questions of state law"l3' to the 
federal courts, Snyder and Zahn have no direct applicability to 
the constitutionality of the ALI proposal because they rested 
solely on statutory grounds that may be altered by Congress. 
Nonetheless, the decisions are significant in their apparent 
continued recognition of the class action diversity rule of Ben 
Hur, despite its apparent inconsistency with the results in 
Snyder and 2 ~ h n . l ~ ~  In Snyder, the Court observed that 
Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is of diverse 
citizenship from the class' opponent, and no non-diverse mem- 
bers are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal 
court even though all other members of the class are citizens 
of the same State as the defendant and have nothing to fear 
from trying the lawsuit in the courts of their own State.133 
Despite its narrow origins under the principle of Freeman 
v. Howe, the class action diversity rule has been read broadly 
to apply to all federal class actions in which jurisdiction is 
based on diversity of citizenship.'" These actions go well be- 
yond class actions under Rule 23(b)(l), which might be thought 
to lie within the principle of Freeman v. Howe and Supreme 
Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble because the interests of absentees 
128. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
129. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
130. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 336-38. 
131. Id. at 340. 
132. See Currie, supra note 30, at 757, 763 (arguing that Zahn implicitly re- 
jected pendent party jurisdiction based solely on the existence of a factual relation- 
ship with jurisdictional claims, whereas Ben Hur accepted it). 
133. 394 U.S. at 340 (citation omitted). 
134. See 7A CHARLES k WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PFtACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
$ 1755 (2d ed. 1986). 
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or the parties before the court are likely, as a practical matter, 
to be prejudiced by separate  adjudication^.'^^ Amended Rule 
23(b)(3) extends to class actions unknown to equity in 1789, 
based solely on the existence of common questions of law and 
fact which "predominate" over individual questions, where a 
class action is determined to be "superior" to the prosecution of 
individual actions for the resolution of the controversy. 
To the extent one assumes that the constitutionality of the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the claims of absent, nondiverse 
members of a class is established, and that this jurisdiction is 
an application of the concept of supplemental jurisdi~tion,'~~ 
that result might be thought generally to support the concept of 
pendent party jurisdiction based on a transactional relationship 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims, an issue 
discussed further below. 
IV. JURISDICTION BASED ON MINIMAL DIVERSITY 
The ALI proposal adds another string to its supplemental 
jurisdiction bow by invoking the concept of "minimal diversity" 
to support removal of nondiverse state law claims by or against 
new parties based on a transactional relationship with claims 
then pending in federal court.137 Based on the Supreme 
Court's interpleader decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. T ~ s h i r e , ' ~ ~  this argument posits that the complete di- 
versity requirement is, in all cases, purely statutory in origin, 
and that so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens, 
the exercise of diversity jurisdiction falls within Article III.13' 
135. See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 
(2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that failure to certify a class action in this securities 
law action would prejudice members of certain subclasses who have interests in a 
limited fund), cert. dismissed, Hart Holding Co. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1070 (1993); In re Bendectin Products Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 
305-06 (6th Cir. 1984) (certification of a class action was proper when there was a 
limited fund at  issue, and individual litigation might prejudice, as a "practical mat- 
ter," the interests of subsequent litigants in the fund). See generally 7A WRIGHT E
AL., supra note 134, $5 1772-74. 
136. One could argue instead that the class action rule rests on the concept 
that, as in actions by a trustee, only the named class representative is the "real 
party in interest" whose citizenship must be considered in determining diversity. 
However, this argument runs contrary to the Supreme Court's refusal to aggregate 
the claims of class members. See Currie, supra note 30, a t  762. 
137. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 5.03 cmt. a at  260. 
138. 386 U.S. 523 (1967). 
139. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 29 (1986). 
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Tashire involved an interpleader action commenced by an 
insurance company against potential claimants to a limited 
insurance fund. While some claimants were of diverse citizen- 
ship from others, and the insurer was of diverse citizenship 
from the ~la imants , '~~  not all of the claimants were diverse 
from each other. In this setting, the Supreme Court raised the 
issue of its subject matter jurisdiction, and concluded that the 
action fell within the federal interpleader statute and the scope 
of Article 111. 
As to statutory authorization, the Court noted that 28 
U.S.C. § 1335 "has been uniformly construed to require only 
'minimal diversity,' that is, diversity of citizenship between two 
or more claimants, without regard to the circumstance that 
other rival claimants may be co-citizens."141 As to the con- 
stitutionality of the statute, the Court stated that "in a variety 
of contexts this Court and the lower courts have concluded that 
Article I11 poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of fed- 
eral jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two ad- 
verse parties are not co-citizens."142 In support of its holding, 
the Court referred in a footnote to cases considering the remov- 
al of a "separate and independent claim or cause of action" 
under 28 U.S.C. 5 1441(c), the Ben Hur case sustaining the 
maintenance of a class action even though some class members 
were not of diverse citizenship from the defendant, cases sus- 
taining intervention by co-citizens, and cases in the lower fed- 
eral courts sustaining federal interpleader based on minimal 
diversity. 143 
The historic provision-now repealed-for removal of an 
entire action based on the presence within that action of a 
"separable," and, after 1948, a "separate and independent," 
controversy between diverse parties1& might suggest the con- 
stitutionality of federal jurisdiction based on the presence of 
any two adverse parties of diverse citizenship. However, none 
of the Supreme Court's decisions addressing removal under 
that provision in cases involving multiple defendants claimed 
to be alternatively or jointly responsible for a plaintiffs injuries 
140. 386 U.S. at 525-27. 
141. Id. at 530. 
142. Id. at 531. 
143. Id. at 531 n.7. 
144. See generally 14A CHAFUES k WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 8 3724 (2d ed. 1985). 
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considered the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction based on 
minimal diversity.145 The Court's first consideration of that 
issue came in Tashire in the context of federal interpleader. 
Commentators have questioned the constitutionality of 
$ 1441(c), both in federal question'" and diversity1" cases. 
In any event, nothing in $ 1441(c) suggests the constitutionality 
of removal to a federal court of a state law case no part of 
which arises under federal law or is between diverse citizens. 
Two points about Tashire are of central importance in 
evaluating its relevance to the ALI's proposal. First, interplead- 
er cases such as Tashire, in which multiple claimants, some 
diverse and some not diverse from each other, are asserting 
mutually inconsistent claims to the same stake, fall within the 
direct line of the Supreme Court's ancillary jurisdiction cases 
emanating from Freeman u. l70we.l~~ The claims at  issue are 
not simply transactionally related (indeed, they may not be 
transactionally related). Rather, their relationship is one of 
logical dependence. The federal interpleader statute requires 
the deposit of the stake or its equivalent with the federal 
court,149 and authorizes the injunction of both federal and 
state court proceedings affecting the property outside the inter- 
pleader.lsO Thus, on its facts, Tashire cannot be read as 
strong support for the ALIYs expansion of supplemental jurisdic- 
tion to reach nondiverse state law claims by and against 
nonparties to a federal action merely because those claims have 
some factual overlap with claims asserted in a suit then pend- 
ing in federal court. 
Second, even broadly read, Tashire cannot support the 
proposition that Article I11 extends to any suit in which volun- 
tary or involuntary joinder of parties is authorized by a federal 
statute or procedural rule, and any two parties in the suit are 
of diverse citizenship. Most obviously, as Tashire recognizes, 
the diverse parties must at  a minimum be "adverse."151 Arti- 
145. See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Pull- 
man Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939); City of Gainsville v. Brown-Crummer 
Inv. Co., 277 U.S. 54 (1928); Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903); 
Connell v. Smiley, 156 U.S. 335 (1895); Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205 (1880). 
146. See 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 144, at 402-03. 
147. See Michael D. Moberly et al., Penetrating the Thicket: Pendent Party Re- 
moval Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1993). 
148. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). 
149. 28 U.S.C. 9 1335(a)(2) (1988). 
150. 28 U.S.C. 9 2361 (1988). 
151. 386 U.S. at 531. 
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cle I11 of the Constitution extends federal jurisdiction only to 
"[c]ontroversies . . . between Citizens of different  state^,"'^^ 
not to any case in which two parties of diverse citizenship may 
be found. Tashire thus fell within the constitutional grant be- 
cause the interests of all of the claimants were potentially 
adverse to each other. 
Beyond this, it cannot be true that whenever a suit be- 
tween citizens of diverse citizenship is commenced in federal 
court, Congress is fkee to authorize the voluntary or involun- 
tary joinder to that suit of any other suit between co-citizens 
regardless of the relationship of that suit to the action in which 
diversity of citizenship is present. This would authorize, for 
example, the joinder, without any independent jurisdictional 
basis, of factually unrelated lawsuits by one diverse and one 
nondiverse plaintiff against a common defendant, simply be- 
cause the suits present a common question of law. Thus, it 
seems apparent that there must be, a t  a minimum, some signif- 
icant factual interrelationship between the diverse and 
nondiverse claims before they may constitutionally be joined in 
federal court as part of one "controversy" under the rubric of 
"minimal diversity." 
Ultimately, there is no reason to conclude that the rela- 
tionship required to join a nondiverse state law claim by or 
against one party with a diversity claim asserted by or against 
another party is any different than the relationship constitu- 
tionally required to permit a nondiverse state law claim by or 
against one party to be joined to a federal question claim by or 
against another party as an exercise of supplemental jurisdic- 
tion. Article I11 authorizes the federal courts to hear "cases" 
that "arise under" federal law, and "[c]ontroversies . . . between 
Citizens of different States." Putting aside the possibility of 
drawing ephemeral distinctions between a single constitutional 
"case" and a single constitutional "controversy," the issue in 
each instance is whether the nonjurisdictional claims at issue 
form part of a single constitutional case all of which "arises 
under" federal law or is "between" diverse citizens, respectively. 
The ALI's proposal thus ultimately draws no additional 
strength fkom its invocation of the concept of minimal diversity. 
The ultimate issue is whether, given a constitutional basis, be 
it a federal question or diversity of citizenship, for the exercise 
152. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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of federal jurisdiction over some claim in the action, nondiverse 
state law claims by or against others are so closely related to 
the jurisdictional claim that they form a part of the same "aris- 
ing under" or diversity "case." The ALI answers this question 
by asserting that the mere existence of a transactional rela- 
tionship between the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims 
is, in all settings, sufficient to make them part of the same con- 
stitutional case. 
V. THE &I PROPOSAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE 
In an argument going well beyond the ALI proposal, one 
commentator has suggested that even Gibbs' "common nucleus 
of operative fact" formulation is not constitutionally required, 
and that a single constitutional "case" or "controversy" may be 
found whenever the joinder of nondiverse state law claims is 
authorized by the rules of joinder adopted from time to time for 
the federal courts. 153 
Even if it had merit as an original matter, this suggestion 
diverges so far from the situations in which the federal courts 
have upheld the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in any of 
its forms that the Supreme Court is unlikely to accept it as a 
basis for upholding legislation embodying the ALI proposal. 
Viewed without regard to precedent and history, moreover, the 
suggestion is fundamentally antithetical to the constitutionally 
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. The suggestion would 
authorize, for example, the exercise of supplemental jurisdic- 
tion over completely unrelated nondiverse state law claims 
between two parties properly before the court on a federal 
question claim, simply because the joinder of that claim is 
authorized by Rule 18, or the exercise of supplemental jurisdic- 
tion over the nondiverse state law claim of a permissive inter- 
venor in a diversity action, simply because that claim shared a 
common question of law with the claims of the parties already 
before the court. 
The mysterious origin and ambiguity of the Supreme 
Court's reference to "one constitutional case" in Gibbs no doubt 
contributed to the emergence of this suggestion. The Court 
stated that "[plendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial pow- 
er, exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under [federal law]' 
and the relationship between that claim and the state claim 
153. Matasar, supra note 30, at 1409-10, 1463, 1477-89. 
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permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court 
comprises but one constitutional 'case.""" If the word "consti- 
tutional" is ignored, it is easy to conclude that, so long as any 
federal question (or diversity) claim within the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts may be found, the federal court's jurisdiction 
extends to all aspects of the "same case9'--defined by generally 
applicable rules of joinder. Thus, it has been argued that, once 
a statutory basis for jurisdiction over one of several originally 
asserted claims has been found, Congress should be held to 
have delegated to the judiciary the power to flesh out the entire 
litigative unit through definition of the scope of the "civil ac- 
tion" referred to in sections 1331 and 1332 of the Judicial 
Code.15' This implied delegation of the power to define the 
scope of a "civil action" is said to constitute a "separate, second 
endeavor" involving a "different part" of the jurisdictional stat- 
utes than that defining the subject matter of the jurisdiction- 
conferring claims. ls6 
To the extent it is relevant to the constitutional issue, 
h~wever,"~ this analysis gives insufficient weight to the fact 
that the supplemental jurisdiction issue turns, not on whether 
there is a single proceeding that could be asserted within a uni- 
fied court system, but whether there is a single "case," all of 
which may properly be said to arise under federal law or to be 
"between" citizens of different states. Article I11 of the Consti- 
tution extends the jurisdiction of the federal courts, not to any 
"litigation unit," some part of which arises under federal law, 
but only to "all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their Authority."'" Similarly, Article I11 does 
not apply to all consolidated proceedings in which citizens of 
different states are parties, but only to "Controversies . . . be- 
tween Citizens of different States."15' 
Thus, in its reference to a single "constitutional" case, 
Gibbs must be taken to refer to a case the nonfederal and fed- 
eral aspects of which are so related that the entire case, not 
154. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (citation omitted). 
155. Richard D. Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Juris- 
diction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 55-61. 
156. Id. at 56, 59. 
157. See id. at 56-57 (equating the scope of the "civil action" under 28 U.S.C. 
$8 1331, 1332 with the scope of the constitutional case). 
158. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 2, cl. 1. 
159. Id. 
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simply some part of it, may properly be viewed as being "be- 
tween" diverse citizens, or as "arising under" federal law. Rules 
which authorize joinder on the basis of efficiency and fairness 
within a unified court system are addressed to an issue that is 
unrelated both to the nature of the suit as determined by the 
character of its parties or its subject matter, and to the policies 
that underlie the categorical grants of jurisdiction set out in 
Article 111. For that reason, procedural rules of efficient joinder 
should not provide the yardstick by which the constitutionality 
of an assertion of federal court jurisdiction should be measured. 
Of course, the ALI proposal does not adopt the view that 
any joinder authorized by procedural rules forms part of the 
same constitutional case for the purpose of evaluating the con- 
stitutionality of the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Rath- 
er, it adopts the single "transaction or occurrence" standard of 
relatedness, which it claims derives from Gibbs. Ultimately, 
however, the ALI proposal suffers from the same fallacy as the 
more expansive suggestion that a single "constitutional case" 
arising under federal law, or between diverse citizens, is what- 
ever the rule drafters say that it is. 
This flaw may be seen both in the evolution of the "same 
transaction or occurrence" test for supplemental jurisdiction, 
and in the justifications advanced for the ALI proposal. Nota- 
bly, the ALI did not adopt as its standard for the assertion of 
pendent party jurisdiction the "common nucleus of operative 
fact" formulation of Gibbs itself. Perhaps because the origins 
and meaning of that standard were unclear, many federal 
courts soon came to equate i t  with the "same transaction or 
occurrence" standard so prevalent in the joinder provisions of 
the federal rules,l6' which in turn echoed the language of 
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,lG1 dealing with the com- 
pulsory counterclaim provision of former Equity Rule 30.1G2 
While the "same transaction or occurrence" language of the 
Federal Rules is hardly self-defining and has received a variety 
of interpretations by the lower federal courts,163 the preferred 
modern interpretation is that claims are sufficiently related to 
satisfy the "same transaction" standard if they have a "logical 
160. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 57. 
161. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76. 
163. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 57; 13 WRIGHT E AL., supra note 
75, at 107-15. 
860 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
relationship" such that some judicial economy will be achieved 
by their joinder, even if they involve factual and legal differenc- 
e ~ . ' ~ ~  This is a liberal standard, developed with reference to 
the policies of efficiency and fairness within a single system of 
courts. It takes no account, explicitly or implicitly, of the limit- 
ed jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by the Constitu- 
tion. Nor does it address whether all the claims so joined can, 
in some meaningful sense, be said to "arise under" federal law 
or to be "between Citizens of different States," even though 
they themselves are neither, because of their close relationship 
to other claims that do lie within the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
The ALI has thus proffered a procedurally oriented test for 
supplemental jurisdiction that developed with little or no re- 
gard for the considerations of federalism on which that test 
should primarily depend. And, because the "same transaction" 
test is focused on instrumental concerns of efficiency and fair- 
ness within a single system of courts, it has received an ex- 
tremely broad and liberal interpretation by the federal courts, 
in stark contrast to repeated decisions of the Supreme Court 
emphasizing that the jurisdictional authorizations of the feder- 
al courts should be narrowly c~ns t rued . '~~ 
The policy reasons advanced by the ALI to support its 
supplemental jurisdiction proposal also reflect its proceduralist, 
rather than federalist, origins. Some weight is accorded to the 
interests of federalism. However, federalism concerns emerge 
principally in connection with the discretionary considerations 
that the Complex Litigation Panel may take into account in 
determining whether removal and consolidation should be 
ordered in a particular case, rather than with respect to the 
scope of the power to order removal and con~olidation.'~~ The 
overriding policy underlying the ALI proposal, including its 
removal and supplemental jurisdiction provisions, is not wheth- 
164. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at  94-96. 
165. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374-75 
(1978) (holding that pendent jurisdiction cannot subvert diversity requirements 
since "federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and "[tlhe limits upon feder- 
al jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be nei- 
ther disregarded nor evaded"); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 
107-09 (1941) (narrowly construing the removal statute based on legislative history 
"indicating the Congressional purpose to narrow the federal jurisdiction on remov- 
al"). 
166. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 5 5.01 cmt. c a t  229; 
zd. cmt. d at  235. 
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er the nondiverse state law cases it embraces may properly be 
said to "arise under" federal law or to be "between Citizens of 
different States," as the Constitution requires, but whether the 
efficiency and fairness considerations that underlie the 
transactionally based joinder provisions of the Federal Rules 
will be furthered if removal is permitted.167 In this way, the 
ALI proposal comes very close to saying that whenever joinder 
based on efficiency considerations would be desirable within a 
single system of courts, there can be no constitutional objection 
to it. 
In other settings involving the interpretation of Article 111, 
the Supreme Court has rejected the contention that consider- 
ations of efficiency should determine the boundaries of federal 
court jurisdiction. In rejecting the argument, in Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Ha~derrnan, '~~ that the actions of 
state officers in violation of state law could be enjoined under 
the doctrine of Ex parte Young16' despite the bar of the Elev- 
enth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the potential 
for achieving judicial economy by the exercise of pendent juris- 
diction over such claims could not enlarge the scope of federal 
judicial power. The Court concluded that considerations of 
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants "cannot 
override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the 
federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State."17' Rath- 
er, "[tlhat a litigant's choice of forum is reduced 'has long been 
understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of 
federalism.' "I7' 
The result in Pennhurst has been justly ~rit icized. '~~ 
167. See id. 8 3.01 cmt. a a t  39 ("Cases should be joined for common treat- 
ment only when consolidation furthers fairness and efficiency goals."); id. § 5.01 
cmt. a a t  222 ("The removal jurisdiction provided for in this section is designed to 
foster consolidation and more efficient and fair treatment of related claims there- 
by."); id. § 5.03 cmt. b at  261 (explaining that this section gives "statutory authori- 
zation" to exert jurisdiction over "transactionally related claims," giving a transferee 
court the "ability to exert control over [an] entire controversy in an effort to 
achieve the most efficient, economical, and fair resolution of the dispute"). 
168. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
169. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
170. 465 U.S. at  120, 123. 
171. Id. (quoting Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 
U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result)). 
172. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Beyond PennhursGProtective Jurisdiction, the 
Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in 
Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985); David L. Shapiro, Wrong 
Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 
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That criticism, however, is more appropriately directed to the 
Court's understanding of the scope of the Eleventh Amendment 
itself,'" and to the potential that Pennhurst's holding will 
force litigants possessing federal claims to litigate in state 
court to obtain a comprehensive disposition of their claims and 
undermine the policy of constitutional avoidan~e, '~~ than to 
the conclusion that considerations of judicial economy and 
convenience cannot determine or enlarge the scope of 
Article III.'" The fundamental underpinning of the ALI pro- 
posal, by contrast, is that just such considerations of judicial 
economy and convenience do, in themselves, determine the 
scope of Article 111, without any additional requirement that 
the nondiverse state law cases engrossed by its removal and 
consolidation provision "arise under" federal law or involve 
disputes "between" citizens of different states, or significantly 
impair the federal courts' ability to exercise jurisdiction over 
cases that do. 
The ALI proposal stands in marked contrast to the limited 
view that Congress and the Supreme Court historically have 
taken of the power of the federal courts to enjoin state court 
proceedings based on their factual overlap with parallel litiga- 
tion then pending in federal court. The Anti-Injunction Act,'" 
although a statutory rather than a constitutional restraint, re- 
flects suppositions about the proper allocation of power be- 
tween the federal and state courts that were shared by the 
Framers of the Constitution. From the beginning, the Act has 
been interpreted to preclude federal injunctions of parallel 
state proceedings involving nondiverse state law claims based 
solely on their substantial factual identity or overlap with 
pending federal proceedings. In Kline v. Burke Construction 
(1984). 
173. See Shapiro, supra note 172, at 71-76. 
174. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: 
The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
643, 663-64 (1985); John P. Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amend- 
ment, 75 CALF. L. REV. 129, 153-67 (1987); see also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville 
R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1969). 
175. See Chemerinsky, supra note 174, at 660 ("No matter how great the effi- 
ciency justifications for pendent jurisdiction, it cannot be allowed if not authorized 
by the Constitution and the federal question jurisdiction statute."); Dwyer, supm 
note 174, at 153. 
176. 28 U.S.C. 5 2283 (1988). 
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C O . ' ~ ~  the Supreme Court, pertinently to the issues raised by 
the ALI proposal, observed that 
a controversy is not a thing, and a controversy over a mere 
question of personal liability does not involve the possession 
or control of a thing, and an action brought to enforce such a 
liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of 
the court in which a prior action for the same cause is pend- 
ing. Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its 
own time, without reference to the proceedings &I the other 
court. 
Although a statutory restraint, the Anti-Injunction Act 
reflects the Framers' understanding of the proper constitutional 
boundaries of federal court jurisdiction as well. In Atlantic 
Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi- 
neers,'" Justice Black described the origins of the Act in the 
following terms: 
[Flrom the beginning we have had in this country two essen- 
tially separate legal systems. Each system proceeds indepen- 
dently of the other with ultimate review in this Court of the 
federal questions raised in either system. Understandably this 
dual court system was bound to lead to conflicts and frictions. 
Litigants who foresaw the possibility of more favorable treat- 
ment in one or the other system would predictably hasten to 
invoke the powers of whichever court it was believed would 
present the best chance of success. Obviously this dual system 
could not function if state and federal courts were free to fight 
each other for control of a particular case. Thus, in order to 
make the dual system work and "to prevent needless friction 
between state and federal courts," it was necessary to work 
out lines of demarcation between the two systems.180 
Justice Black concluded by recognizing the constitutional un- 
derpinnings of the Act: "[Slince the statutory prohibition 
against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental con- 
stitutional independence of the States and their courts, the 
177. 260 US .  226 (1922). 
178. Id. at 230. 
179. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). 
180. Id. at 286 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Oklahoma Packing 
Co. v. Gas Co., 309 US.  4, 9 (1940)). 
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exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construe- 
tion."lgl 
Two of the exceptions to the current version of the Act are 
of primary importance in connection with the ALI proposal: 
that for injunctions "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," 
and that for injunctions "necessary in aid of [the District 
Court's] juri~diction."'~~ As to the former, Congress has not 
authorized an injunction of a nondiverse state law suit simply 
because some of its parties might also be involved in a pending 
federal action, let alone, as the ALI proposes, simply because 
the state suit may involve some factual overlap with a pending 
federal proceeding. Rather, Congressionally authorized injunc- 
tions have been designed to effectuate a federal court's jurisdic- 
tion over cases that have been properly filed in or removed to 
the court.lg3 
The interpretation given the "in aid of jurisdiction" excep- 
tion to the Anti-Injunction Act is also pertinent to the issues 
raised by the ALI proposal, because that interpretation reflects 
an understanding of the scope of the federal "case" in aid of 
which the injunction may issue. In Atlantic Coast Line, the 
Court gave this exception a very narrow construction, limiting 
it not simply to cases involving parallel litigation, but to cases 
in which the grant of an injunction is "necessary to prevent a 
state court from so interfering with a federal court's consid- 
eration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the feder- 
al court's flexibility and authority to decide that case."184 The 
Court concluded that the case before it in Atlantic Coast Line 
was not of that character because "the state and federal courts 
had concurrent jurisdiction in this case, and neither court was 
free to prevent either party from simultaneously pursuing 
claims in both courts."185 
In the years since Atlantic Coast Line, federal courts have 
been called upon to apply the Anti-Injunction Act and its "in 
aid of jurisdiction" exception in cases presenting difficulties 
very similar to those addressed by the ALI proposal, in which 
complex litigation involving many of the same parties and 
181. Id. at 287 (emphasis added). 
182. 28 U.S.C. $ 2283 (1988). 
183. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232-35 & nn.12-17 (1972); BATOR ET 
AL., supra note 14, at 1324-26. See generally 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED- 
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE $ 4224 (2d ed. 1988). 
184. 398 U.S. at 295. 
185. Id. 
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issues was pending in both federal and state courts. Notwith- 
standing that purely procedural considerations of efficiency and 
economy would clearly have called for restraint of the parallel 
state proceedings, the courts generally have held that an in- 
junction of the state proceedings is not appropriate until a 
settlement of the federal action has actually been reached or is 
imrninent.ls6 In such circumstances, the federal action begins 
to resemble a dispute over limited funds within the control of 
the federal court of the kind that historically has provided a 
basis for ancillary jurisdiction. 
In In re Baldwin-United Corp.,ls7 for example, the Sec- 
ond Circuit sustained a federal court injunction preventing the 
attorneys general of fifty states fiom instituting proceedings 
seeking restitution under state law on behalf of their citizens 
on account of the same transactions that were the subject of 
over one-hundred federal securities lawsuits against twenty-six 
defendants which had been transferred and consolidated for 
pretrial proceedings in the federal district court. The federal 
injunction was issued before the institution of any state pro- 
ceedings, and so the Anti-Injunction Act was technically inap- 
plicable. In upholding the injunction under the All Writs 
Act,ls8 however, the Second Circuit analogized the issue to 
that presented by the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act, drew upon cases construing the Act, and 
implied that the result would have been the same even if state 
186. Compare Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 916 
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990) (reversing injunction granted to federal antitrust plaintiff 
against the prosecution of state antitrust litigation subsequently instituted by the 
defendant) and In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) ("man- 
datory" Rule 23(b)(l) class action decertified on the ground that it implicitly pre- 
cluded class members fiom litigating their state court actions on issues of liability 
and punitive damages), cert. denied, 459 US. 988 (1982) with Carlough v. Amchem 
Products Co., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming injunction of state class action 
by members of federal class action for asbestos related tort damages to protect fed- 
eral court's ability to effectuate a pending settlement of the federal action) and 
Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1989) (affirming in- 
junction of state court actions by members of federal class after federal judgment 
had been entered on a settlement because the state actions would destroy the 
federal settlement that had been worked out over a period of years) and In re 
Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming federal court injunc- 
tion of threatened break-away state proceedings prior to entry of federal judgment 
where federal securities action was on the verge of settlement). 
187. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985). 
188. 28 U.S.C. $ 1651 (1988). 
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proceedings had been commenced at  the time the federal in- 
junction was issued. lS9 
The court first considered the validity of the injunction as 
to actions against eighteen of the twenty-six defendants that 
were on the verge of settlement. In these actions, settlement 
agreements had been signed and preliminarily approved by the 
court, and fairness hearings had been scheduled. The proposed 
settlements provided for release of all of the settling plaintiffs' 
federal and related state claims on account of the transactions 
in question. The district court approved the injunction against 
supplemental state proceedings seeking "restitution" on behalf 
of members of the federal class on the ground that such litiga- 
tion would frustrate the settlements that had already been 
reached. Absent an injunction preventing the attorneys general 
from seeking additional recovery on account of the same claims 
that were released by the federal settlements, the federal 
court's "flexibility and authority to decide" the case before it 
would be seriously impaired.'" 
The existence of multiple and harassing actions by the 
states could only serve to frustrate the district court's efforts 
to craft a settlement in the multidistrict litigation before it. 
The success of any federal settlement was dependent on the 
parties' ability to agree to the release of any and all related 
civil claims the plaintiffs had against the settling defendants 
based on the same facts. If states or others could derivatively 
assert the same claims on behalf of the same class or mem- 
bers of it, there could be no certainty about the finality of any 
federal settlement. Any substantial risk of this prospect 
would threaten all of the settlement efforts by the district 
court and destroy the utility of the multidistrict forum other- 
wise ideally suited to resolving such broad claims. 
. . . In effect, unlike the situation in the Kline v. Burke 
Construction Co. line of cases, the district court had before it 
a class action proceeding so far advanced that it was the 
virtual equivalent of a res over which the district judge re- 
quired full control. lgl 
189. 770 F.2d at 335-36. 
190. Id. at 335 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 295). 
191. Id. at 337. In Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 
1993), the Third Circuit followed the reasoning of Baldwin-United and its previous 
decision in In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Services Antitrust Litigation, 
869 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821 (1989), in holding that the 
federal district court had properly enjoined a state class action by members of a 
federal "opt-out" class action for asbestos-related tort damages to protect the feder- 
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The court also concluded that the injunction was proper as 
to actions against the eight defendants who had not yet entered 
settlement agreements, given the fact that settlement negotia- 
tions were ongoing and there was "a substantially significant 
prospect that these [eight] defendants will settle in the reason- 
ably near future."lg2 However, should it appear that "prompt 
settlement was no longer likely," the court indicated that the 
injunctions should be lifted, because the pendency of 
duplicative federal and state court litigation in and of itself 
ordinarily provides no basis for a federal injunction.lg3 
If, as the previous discussion suggests, the boundaries of 
federal authority are not properly based on purely procedural 
considerations of efficiency and judicial economy, the question 
remains how the limits of the federal constitutional case should 
be discerned. While the answer is hardly self-evident, the ques- 
tion that should be asked is different than the one the ALI has 
posed. The ALI has asked what rules of removal, transfer, and 
consolidation would optimally promote efficiency, judicial econ- 
omy, and consistent outcomes in multiple cases involving the 
same subject matter. Its answers to these questions are not 
beyond debate on their own terms. But the relevant question is 
not whether judicial economy and efficiency of the kind that 
would be desirable within a unified court system will be 
achieved. Rather, it is whether the kinds of removal and con- 
solidation that the ALI would authorize can fairly be said to 
have been within the contemplation of the Framers. 
The answer to this question poses considerable difficulty, if 
only because it is a question for which there is no apparent his- 
torical analogue. One might be tempted to look to the joinder 
provisions and procedural devices employed by courts of equity 
to achieve the entire resolution of controversies and avoid a 
multiplicity of actions at  the time of adoption of the Constitu- 
tion. Such devices would include interpleader, class actions, 
and the "bill of peace."lg4 However, it would be difficult to 
a1 court's ability to effectuate a pending settlement of the federal action. Unlike In 
re Real Estate Title, the class members could preserve their right to litigate in a 
forum of their choice by availing themselves of the opportunity to opt out of the 
federal action. Carlough, 10 F.3d at 204. The court's decision was strongly influ- 
enced by the fact that the state action was, in essence, a challenge to the validity 
of the federal action, rather than an independent assertion of the class members' 
rights. 
192. 770 F.2d at 338. 
193. Id. 
194. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME P R O B ~ M S  OF EQUITY 149-98, 
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find in this history any clear foundation for the ALI's proposal 
for the federal courts' control over purely state law tort claims 
for damages based on nothing more than a transactional rela- 
tionship with claims then pending in federal court. 
For example, the scope of "true" class actions recognized in 
equity was obviously much narrower than those endorsed by 
amended Rule 23 in 1966.1g5 While the historical equitable 
class action analogy might support the existence of "ancillary" 
jurisdiction over conflicting claims to property such as those at 
issue in Ben-Hur, it would do nothing to establish the propriety 
of federal jurisdiction based on the predominance of common 
questions of fact under Rule 23(b)(3), let alone to support re- 
moval of nonjurisdictional claims that have not been certified 
as part of a federal class action based on the existence of some 
factual overlap, as the ALI has proposed. 
In any event, like the inquiry based on modern conceptions 
of efficient procedure, the historic inquiry based on the division 
of judicial business between courts of law and equity in Eng- 
land would appear to reflect policies that have limited rele- 
vance to the allocation of judicial business by subject matter 
and the character of the parties effected by Article I11 of the 
Constitution.lg6 
Are there then no meaningful guideposts from which the 
answer to the important constitutional question posed by the 
ALI's proposal can be found? At a minimum, the history and 
circumstances of the Supreme Court's decisions upholding the 
exercise of "supplemental" jurisdiction over nonjurisdictional 
claims by and against additional parties is an important con- 
sideration which appears to have been given little attention or 
weight by the drafters of the ALI proposal. Those decisions 
have adopted a cautious approach to the expansion of federal 
jurisdiction, and have affirmatively endorsed supplemental 
jurisdiction over additional parties only in cases in which more 
than a simple transactional relationship between the federal 
and state claims existed. Thus, as previously discussed, the 
Supreme Court has sustained the exercise of ancillary jurisdic- 
200-03, 214-15 (1950); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
$5 1172-1181 (14th ed. 1918). 
195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note for 1966 Amendments. 
196. See CHAFEE, supra note 194, at 170-75, 193, 198 (reviewing conflicting au- 
thorities regarding the appropriateness of an equitable bill of peace based on multi- 
plicity of tort damages actions alone; assuming that the appropriateness of an equi- 
table remedy does not obviate limitations on federal jurisdiction). 
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tion when the prosecution of separate federal and state actions 
would impair the federal court's ability to effectuate its judg- 
ment, would involve the prosecution of conflicting claims to 
property or funds within the control of the federal court, or 
would prevent an existing party from fully defending itself in a 
single proceeding. Lower courts have readily extended supple- 
mental jurisdiction to other settings in which the disposition of 
claims by or against additional parties is logically dependent on 
or intertwined with the litigation before the federal court.197 
This suggests that the focus of analysis in determining the 
scope of supplemental jurisdiction should not be on intersystem 
judicial economy, but on the need for supplemental jurisdiction 
to permit the federal courts properly to exercise jurisdiction in 
the categories of cases enumerated by Article 111. This ap- 
proach would embrace the assumption that the Framers would 
not have intended Article III's categorical authorizations of 
jurisdiction to be so limited that they would result in ineffec- 
tive judgments, prevent parties already before the court from 
fully and adequately defending themselves in a single proceed- 
ing, or, as a practical matter, prejudice the rights of absentees 
in the specific subject matter of the arising under or diversity 
case already before the court. 
Such an approach would not lead to the conclusion that 
supplemental jurisdiction is narrowly appropriate only where 
"necessary" or "indispensable" to the exercise of the jurisdiction 
explicitly conferred by Article 111. It would, however, require a 
determination that the pendency of parallel state litigation 
between nondiverse parties would have a significant impact on 
the ability of the federal courts properly to exercise the jurisdic- 
tion assigned to them by the Constitution and authorized by 
Congress before supplemental jurisdiction could be sustained. 
Thus, the exercise of pendent claim jurisdiction under Gi b bs 
would be sustained on the ground that, even though it is not 
necessary to permit the federal courts to exercise federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction, a contrary result would, as a practical matter, 
unduly impair the exercise of that jurisdiction by forcing liti- 
gants to state court to obtain the entire disposition of their 
claims. lg8 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 163-64. 
198. See Arthur R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 
1, 4 (1985); Schenkier, supra note 30, at 247-48 (arguing that judicial economy 
does not provide a sufficient rationale for pendent claim or pendent party jurisdic- 
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No similar justification closely tied to the "heads" of federal 
jurisdiction undergirds the ALI's proposal, which is based on 
considerations of judicial economy and "convenience" that are 
at  odds with the approach historically taken to defining the 
limited subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Conse- 
quently, the proposal entails a comparatively vast expansion of 
federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states. 
A second consideration given little weight by the ALI is 
that, at the time the Constitution was adopted, litigation was 
conceived in essentially bipolar terms, involving the assertion 
of individual rights between identifiable parties having con- 
crete, adverse interests.''' Joinder of claims and the assertion 
of claims on a class basis were authorized in restricted situa- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  For example, class actions were appropriate when 
the class asserted a common title or right.201 As the kinds of 
joinder authorized by modern procedural rules have dramat- 
ically expanded to achieve efficiency rather than federalism 
objectives, it becomes more and more difficult to say that any 
type of joinder authorized by an evolving system of procedure 
should be viewed as establishing a sufficiently close connection 
between the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims to justi- 
fy their classification as one "arising under" or diversity case. 
Under the ALI proposal, for example, a nondiverse breach 
of warranty claim by a Missouri farmer against a Missouri 
manufacturer of farm equipment properly would be removed 
and consolidated with a diversity action raising similar claims 
by California farmers against the same manufacturer, simply 
because all had purchased similar equipment from the same 
defendant. No matter how one looks at the question, it is diffi- 
cult to believe that the Framers would not have been sur- 
tion, which should be based instead on the need to ensure plaintiffs a true choice 
between federal and state court on their federal question claims). 
199. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282, 1285-88 (1976) ("Litigation is organized as a contest 
between two individuals or at  least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to 
be decided on a winner-takes-all basis."). 
200. See generally 6A CHARLES k WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1581 (2d ed. 1990); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 81, 5 1651. 
201. See, e.g., Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 
(requiring a "common and undivided interest in the subject matter" of the litigation 
for a class action to be maintained), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949); see also 
FED. R. CN. P. 23 advisory committee's note for 1966 Amendments; 7A WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 134, 5 1751 (explaining that many early procedural codes required 
a common or general interest in the subject matter of the action for a class action 
to be maintained). 
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prised--even shocked-to learn that the Missouri farmer's 
claim was part of the same "diversity case" as the California 
action. 
Perhaps the strongest historical support for the &I pro- 
posal lies in the long-standing assumption that nondiverse 
claims of class members lie within the subject matter jurisdic- 
tion of the federal courts, provided the named class representa- 
tive and the defendant are of diverse citizenship. From this, it 
may be argued, it is only a small step to recognize supplemen- 
tal jurisdiction for claims joined on the basis of a transactional 
relationship under Federal Rule 20. However, the class action 
rule arose in an era when "true" class actions were recognized 
only in limited circumstances. Ben Hur itself involved conflict- 
ing claims to funds, a circumstance that historically had sup- 
ported the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Moreover, even if 
one is unwilling to call the constitutionality of amended Rule 
23(b)(3) into question, as such a narrow historical approach 
would, it is a significant additional step to conclude that any 
and all individual claims involuntarily joined or consolidated on 
the basis of a transactional relationship alone form part of the 
same constitutional arising under or diversity case. 
In the context of Rule 23(b)(3) a number of affiliating cir- 
cumstances make it more defensible to view all of the claims in 
the same light, including the fact that common issues do not 
simply exist, but have been determined to "predominate," and 
the fact that the members of the class have been accorded the 
right to exclude themselves from the action to pursue their own 
litigation in state court. Thus, the claims are more easily 
viewed as forming part of a single constitutional case, and 
recognition of federal jurisdiction over such claims poses less of 
a threat to state sovereignty. These are not, however, complete- 
ly satisfactory responses, and logical consistency might well 
lead to the conclusion that, if the ALI proposal exceeds the 
bounds of the constitutional arising under or diversity case, so 
does the Rule 23(b)(3) common question class action to the 
extent it adjudicates the purely state law claims of nondiverse 
class members. 
It must also be recognized that, before Finley, most of the 
courts of appeals had upheld the exercise of "pendent party" 
jurisdiction in cases involving both multiple plaintiffs202 and 
202. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 818 (1983); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 
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multiple defendants203 properly joined under Rule 20. Few of 
those cases contain any careful consideration of the constitu- 
tional issue posed by the exercise of pendent party jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . ~ ' ~  Rather, they simply assumed, without analysis, that 
the Gibbs test applied equally in both pendent claim and pen- 
dent party contexts-an assumption belied by the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Moor, Aldinger, and Finley. Moreover, 
most of the cases involved claims by plaintiffs against defen- 
dants alleged to be jointly or alternatively liable for plaintiffs' 
injuries. In that setting, the possibility of inconsistent results 
in federal and state courts creates the prospect that the plain- 
tiff might recover no compensation at all, even though one of 
the defendants clearly was responsible for the plaintiffs' inju- 
r i e ~ . ~ "  Thus, actions against multiple defendants seeking to 
assign joint, several, or alternative responsibility for a single 
wrong could be argued to be part of a single arising under or 
diversity case where the claims against some, but not all, of the 
defendants fall within Article 111, because the resolution of the 
jurisdictional claims may well depend upon the outcome of the 
nonjurisdictional claims. Moreover, as in the case of pendent 
claim jurisdiction, a contrary result could unduly deter plain- 
tiffs possessing federal question or diversity claims from avail- 
ing themselves of the forum that the Constitution has autho- 
rized and that Congress has accorded to them.206 
By contrast, the removal, transfer, and consolidation pro- 
posed by the ALI would relate, in many cases, to individual 
claims by multiple plaintiffs against a single defendant alleged 
to have manufactured a product that injured them all. In such 
1966). 
203. See, e.g., Grinter v. Petroleum Operation Support Serv., 846 F.2d 1006 
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969 (1988); Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 
645 (11th Cir. 1984); Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 
1975); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 US. 995 
(1974); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
944 (1972). 
204. See, e.g., Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645 (11th Cir. 1984); Leather's 
Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971); Connecticut Gen. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Arango v. Guzman Travel 
Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (examining pendent party jurisdiction 
in light of the limits of Article 111, and addressing minimal diversity under 
Tashire). 
205. See Fortune, supra note 30, at  7. 
206. See Schenkier, supra note 30, a t  281. 
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cases, each claim stands on its own footing. The argument for 
supplemental jurisdiction is therefore more tenuous.207 
VI. THE ALI PROPOSAL AND PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION 
Casual acceptance of the ALI's proposed enlargement of 
removal and supplemental jurisdiction would be ironic in view 
of the controversy that has surrounded the concept of "protec- 
tive jurisdiction"-a controversy that remains unresolved.208 
In its broadest form, the protective jurisdiction theory posits 
that "in any case for which Congress has the constitutional 
power to prescribe federal rules of decision and thus confer 
'true' federal question jurisdiction, it may, without so doing, 
enact a jurisdictional statute, which will provide a federal fo- 
rum for the application of state statute and decisional law."209 
In its narrower version, the theory suggests that 
where Congress has "an articulated and active federal policy 
regulating a field, the 'arising under' clause of Article I11 . . . 
permits the conferring of jurisdiction on the national courts of 
all cases in the area-including those substantively governed 
by state law." In such cases, the protection being offered is 
not to the suitor, as in diversity cases, but to the "congressio- 
nal legislative program."210 
The broad form of the protective jurisdiction theory rests 
on the objectionable premise that a particular category of liti- 
gants needs the protection of a federal forum to ensure the 
impartial application of state law-a premise inconsistent with 
207. See Schenkier, supra note 30, at  286-87 (arguing that pendent party ju- 
risdiction should not extend to additional plaintiffs asserting state law claims). The 
current and historic operation of § 1441(c) authorizing removal of an entire action 
based on the presence of a "separate and independent" or, formerly, a "separable" 
controversy, could similarly be upheld on the ground that some defendants would 
refuse to exercise their right of removal unless other defendants allegedly liable to 
the plaintiff would also be before the removal court, and on the ground that, under 
the rationale stated in the text, the plaintiff could originally have sued all the 
defendants in federal court. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. 
208. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1989) (a purely jurisdiction- 
al statute cannot support "arising under" jurisdiction; declining to adopt protective 
jurisdiction theory); Verlinden V.B. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US. 480, 491- 
92 (1983). See generally BATOR ET AL., supra note 14, a t  983-89; WRIGHT, supra 
note 14, a t  121-24. 
209. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448, 473 (1957) (Frank- 
furter, J., dissenting). 
210. Id. a t  476 (citation omitted) (quoting Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Ques- 
tion" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 192 (1953)). 
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the Constitution's recognition of the need for such protection 
only in actions between citizens of different states and in cer- 
tain other specifically enumerated categories of cases in which 
Article I11 jurisdiction is defined in terms of party status rather 
than subject matter. In its narrower form, protective jurisdic- 
tion finds a somewhat more secure foundation in the "arising 
under" provision of Article 111, because of the perceived necessi- 
ty to protect a federal legislative program. 
Although the ALI's reliance on its supplemental jurisdic- 
tion theory tends to obscure the point, the proposal ultimately 
is driven by the determination that there is a need to "protect" 
the ALI's vision of the proper functioning of both federal and 
state judiciaries. However, even assuming the validity of the 
protective jurisdiction theory in some form, it provides no sup- 
port for the ALI's removal, consolidation, and supplemental ju- 
risdiction provisions. The ALI does not suggest that its propos- 
al is justified by the necessity to protect any particular category 
of litigants from state court bias. Moreover, the ALI has delib- 
erately avoided any recommendation for the enactment of legis- 
lation establishing (or authorizing the federal courts to fashion) 
federal substantive rules of decision for the multiparty, 
multiforum litigation that is the subject of the proposal's con- 
 ern.^" Rather, the ALI recommends the adoption of a choice- 
of-law rule designed, if feasible, to lead to the application of the 
law of a single state to the removed, transferred, and consoli- 
dated  proceeding^.^'^ 
The operation of a federal "legislative program" of a sort is 
implicated by the ALI's proposal, namely, the jurisdictional and 
procedural provisions establishing the federal court system and 
governing its operations. Even assuming that the exercise of 
protective jurisdiction on this ground could survive the objec- 
tion that an enlargement of Article I11 cannot be based on the 
need to "protect" the limited grants of jurisdiction contained in 
Article I11 itself,213 however, an equally basic objection re- 
mains: at bottom, the ALI proposal is not grounded on any 
211. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 3 (recommending a pure- 
ly "procedural solution" to the problems addressed); id. at 305-09 (same). 
212. See id. $$ 6.01, 6.03. 
213. See Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdic- 
tion, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 196-206 (1990) ("If the Court has been reluctant to 
endorse the theory of protective jurisdiction even when an article [sic] I legislative 
purpose is present, there can be little hope that the Court will endorse this theory 
for a 'purely' jurisdiction-conferring statute."). 
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determination that federal jurisdictional authority over the 
nondiverse state law cases whose removal and consolidation it 
authorizes would be necessary, or even significantly helpful, to 
permit the federal courts to hear and determine federal ques- 
tion and diversity cases that do fall within the scope of Arti- 
cle 111. Nor is the proposal based on the conclusion that remov- 
al and consolidation is necessary to ensure that a litigant pos- 
sessing a federal question or diversity claim will enjoy unim- 
peded access to a federal forum, or that a defendant in the 
federal action otherwise will be unable fully and fairly to de- 
fend itself, or that the rights of absentees will be practically 
prejudiced by the disposition of the subject matter of the feder- 
al action. Rather, the ALI's recommendation is simply ground- 
ed in the determination that overall intersystem judicial econo- 
my and consistency of result will be enhanced if the nondiverse 
state law cases whose removal and transfer it authorizes are 
heard and resolved together with cases involving the same 
subject matter then pending in federal 
This is far different than saying that, absent such removal 
and consolidation, the ability of the federal courts to conduct 
the judicial business that the Constitution entrusts to them 
would be defeated or significantly impaired. This is illustrated, 
for example, by the Proposal's "reverse removal" provisions 
providing for the transfer of federal cases to state court for 
consolidated disposition in limited  circumstance^.^^^ If im- 
pairment of the federal courts' ability to discharge Article I11 
business, rather than purely instrumental concerns of judicial 
economy, were the foundation for the ALI proposal, the reverse 
removal provision would impede rather than promote the pro- 
tection of the federal interest at  stake. 
214. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, a t  217-19 ("In 
order to maximize the ability to achieve a fair and efficient resolution of the entire 
controversy and to avoid redundant and duplicative litigation, possibilities for 
intersystem consolidation should be considered seriously."); id. 5 5.01 cmt. a a t  223 
("In most cases, removal and consolidation of transactionally related claims sharing 
common questions of fact will promote judicial efficiency . . . ."); see also id. at  7, 
16-17; id. 5 3.01, 5 3.01 cmt. a, 5 3.01 cmt. c a t  44-47; id. 5 3.04, 5 3.04 cmt. a a t  
86; id. 5 5.01, 5 5.01 cmt. a, 5 5.01 cmt. a note, 5 5.01 cmt. b, 5 5.01 cmt. c a t  
229-30; id. 5 5.03, 5 5.03 cmt. a, 5 5.03 cmt. a note, 5 5.03 cmt. b, 5 5.03 cmt. b 
note. 
215. See id. at  165-68; id. 5 4.01; id. cmt. a at  179-80; id. cmt. e a t  186-87. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The imperatives of judicial economy and consistent out- 
comes in mass tort and other complex litigation have gained 
immense force in recent years as multiple federal and state 
actions involving overlapping subject matter and parties have 
become more prevalent, imposing large and increasing burdens 
on the federal and state judiciaries. It is, therefore, not surpris- 
ing that proposals such as that of the ALI, promising to ratio- 
nalize this untidy landscape, reduce litigation burdens, increase 
judicial efficiency, and achieve consistent outcomes, have 
gained significant individual and institutional support. 
These same pressures and imperatives, however, have 
created an unfortunate tendency to brush aside obstacles aris- 
ing from our federal system of government and dual system of 
courts, on the ground that they take inadequate account of 
modern litigation realities inconceivable at  the time the Consti- 
tution was adopted. They also have created a powerful tempta- 
tion to finesse objections based on the limited categories of 
subject matter jurisdiction authorized for the federal courts by 
Article 111, by broadly equating-without significant 
precedential or historical support-the scope of the federal 
arising under or diversity "case" with any system of joinder 
that enlightened proceduralists might wish to adopt to achieve 
the efficient, comprehensive, and consistent disposition of liti- 
gation. 
The fundamental objection to the ALI's removal, consolida- 
tion, and supplemental jurisdiction provisions is that they are 
based ultimately on the overriding policy of achieving the effi- 
cient disposition of litigation among two separate systems of 
courts, rather than on any principled attempt to identify those 
categories of nondiverse state law cases that, because of their 
impact on the federal courts' ability fully and fairly to adjudi- 
cate federal question or diversity cases properly before them, 
should be subject to congressional control under the Constitu- 
tion. 
Expanded beyond its immediate context, where the federal 
courts' power to entertain pendent claims may be essential to 
the full effectuation of the constitutional and statutory grants 
of federal question jurisdiction, Gibbs' efficiency-based "common 
nucleus of operative fact" formulation of the constitutional case 
lacks any clear support in the language or history of the Con- 
stitution, and conflicts with the limited role given consider- 
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ations of intersystem judicial economy in determining the scope 
of Article 111. 
This is not to say that congressional authority to enlarge 
the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction is, or should be, 
narrowly confined by a requirement that the determination of 
related state law claims be "indispensable" or even "necessary" 
to the disposition of a federal question or diversity case. At the 
least, however, the power of the federal courts to entertain 
nondiverse state law claims should be reasonably grounded on 
a determination that, absent such an exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction, the power of the federal courts to entertain and 
dispose of federal question and diversity cases properly before 
them will be affected significantly. Thus, pendent claim juris- 
diction and pendent party jurisdiction against defendants al- 
leged to be jointly, severally, or alternatively liable for a 
plaintiffs injuries would be sustained on the ground that the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in such circumstances is 
necessary to ensure that a plaintiff possessing a diversity or 
federal question claim will enjoy unimpeded access to a federal 
forum. This approach, however, would shift the focus of analy- 
sis from considerations of intersystem judicial economy alone, 
on which the ALI proposal is based, to the policies underlying 
the limited and categorical grants of subject matter jurisdiction 
contained in Article 111, in which the limits of federal jurisdic- 
tion ultimately must be found. 
